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Sub-Saharan Africa is the only developing region in the world where food insecurity has
worsened instead of improved in recent decades. In this discussion paper, Mark W.
Rosegrant, Sarah A. Cline, Weibo Li, Timothy B. Sulser, and Rowena A. Valmonte-Santos
show that this discouraging trend need not be a blueprint for the future.  The research
contained in this discussion paper was conducted in preparation for the IFPRI 2020 Africa
conference “Assuring Food and Nutrition Security in Africa by 2020: Prioritizing Actions,
Strengthening Actors, and Facilitating Partnerships,” held in Kampala, Uganda, April 1–3,
2004. 
The authors examine the implications of several different policy scenarios based on
IFPRI’s International Model for Policy Analysis of Agricultural Commodities and Trade
(IMPACT). This model, developed at IFPRI in the early 1990s, has been continually updated
to incorporate more food sectors and geographic regions. In this paper, the authors use
IMPACT to assess the consequences of a wide range of policy and investment choices for
Africa, including a business as usual scenario (continuation of current policy and investment
trends through 2025), a pessimistic scenario (declining trends in key investments and in
agricultural productivity), and a vision scenario (improving trends in investments and hence
in agricultural productivity and human capital), as well as scenarios for more effective use of
rainfall in agriculture, reduced marketing margins, and three different scenarios for trade
liberalization. The wide variation in results reveals how much these choices will matter. For
example, the number of malnourished children under five years old in Sub-Saharan Africa in
2025 is projected to be 38.3 million under business as usual, 55.1 million under the
pessimistic scenario, and 9.4 million under the vision scenario.  It is our hope that this
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AcknowledgmentsFood security in Africa has substantially worsened since 1970. Although the proportion of
malnourished individuals in Sub-Saharan Africa has remained in the range of 33–35
percent since around 1970, the absolute number of malnourished people in Africa has
increased substantially with population growth, from around 88 million in 1970 to an
estimate of over 200 million in 1999–2001.
Yet this discouraging trend need not be a blueprint for the future. New research from
IFPRI shows that policy choices and investments made now could substantially improve, or
further worsen, the prospects for food security in Africa over the next two decades. This
paper explores and evaluates the consequences of various policies related to food security
in Africa based on projections for the year 2025, focusing on agricultural production. It
uses IFPRI’s International Model for Policy Analysis of Agricultural Commodities and Trade
(IMPACT) and IMPACT–WATER to consider how several different policy scenarios are likely
to affect the supply of, demand for, and trade of crops. The results of these policy scenarios
show that the number of malnourished children, one important indicator of food security,
could rise as high as 41.9 million or fall as low as 9.4 million by 2025.
The business as usual scenario assumes a continuation of current trends and existing
plans in food policy, management, and investment, including declining investments in the
agricultural sector. Agricultural production grows only modestly to 2025. Although per
capita kilocalorie consumption rises and the percentage of malnourished children under
age five falls from 32.8 to 28.2 percent, the absolute number of malnourished children
rises from 32.7 million in 1997 to 38.3 million in 2025.
The pessimistic scenario envisions a future in which trends in agricultural production
and nutrition deteriorate by comparison with business as usual. African countries
experience a decline in both domestic and international investments in education, health,
clean water, and agricultural research. Agricultural productivity and yield growth decline
compared with business as usual, whereas harvested area growth increases at the same
slow rate as in business as usual. Malnutrition in Africa proliferates under this scenario. Per
capita kilocalorie availability in Sub-Saharan Africa increases only slightly, and the total
number of malnourished children under five years old in Sub-Saharan Africa escalates from
32.7 million to 55.1 million in 2025.
The vision scenario attempts to show what type of transformation would be necessary
for Africa to reach the MDG target of cutting the proportion of people suffering from hunger
in half by 2015. In this scenario national governments and international donors increase
investments in education, HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment, water-harvesting
technologies and agricultural extension, female schooling, and clean water access in
Africa. Population growth slows, but gross domestic product and crop productivity increase
significantly. Under this scenario available kilocalories per capita increase markedly in
Sub-Saharan Africa, while the total number of malnourished children is reduced to 9.4
Executive Summary
ximillion in 2025. Most notably, the percentage of malnourished children under five years
old meets—or comes close to meeting—the proposed MDG target of cutting the percentage
of malnourished children in half by 2015 in all African regions.
IMPACT was also used to model other types of scenarios related to specific
technologies, policies, and investments. Three scenarios show that improved water
harvesting can result in increased effective rainfall for agricultural use in rainfed areas, with
consequent increases in agricultural production and declines in cereal prices. A reduced
marketing margins scenario showed the effects of improvements in rural infrastructure,
marketing, and communications. This scenario leads to an increase in cereal production
and demand in Africa, while reducing the percentage of malnourished children in Sub-
Saharan Africa in 2025 to 25.2 percent, compared with the 26.8 percent projected under
business as usual. This percentage difference is equivalent to 2.3 million fewer malnour-
ished children under five years old in Sub-Saharan Africa in 2025. Finally, three scenarios
were modeled to assess the effects of different levels of trade liberalization on Africa. These
scenarios all raise commodity prices to varying degrees, but full trade liberalization also
offers substantial net economic benefits to Africa. 
Many of the challenges facing Africa’s agricultural sector stem from a few root causes,
including poor political and economic governance in many African countries, inadequate
funding for the agricultural sector, poor water resources management, and neglect of
research and development. The strategies for addressing these challenges should take into
account local, natural, and human resources, as well as the political and economic agenda
of each country. However, the various scenarios assessed here point to common policy
priorities for addressing food and nutrition security in Africa. These priorities include (1)
reform of agricultural policies, trade, and tariffs; (2) increased investment in rural
infrastructure, education, and social capital; (3) better management of crops, land, water,
and inputs; (4) increased agricultural research and extension; and (5) greater investments
in women.
xiiIn 2000 the world community adopted eight
Millennium Development Goals that aimed to pro-
mote human development and reduce poverty,
hunger, and disease, even in the poorest coun-
tries. Some developing regions and countries 
are making progress toward these goals, but in
many categories measured, including food secu-
rity, the situation in Africa is stagnant or worsen-
ing. More than 200 million Africans now suffer
from malnutrition. 
Policy choices and investments made now
could substantially improve, or further worsen, the
prospects for food security in Africa over the next
two decades. This paper explores and evaluates
the consequences of various policies related to
food security in Africa based on projections for the
year 2025, focusing on agricultural production.
We use IFPRI’s International Model for Policy
Analysis of Agricultural Commodities and Trade
(IMPACT) to consider how several different policy
scenarios are likely to affect the supply of,
demand for, and trade of crops. We also draw on
IFPRI’s IMPACT–WATER model to examine addi-
tional projections concerning the future of water
resources.
The paper begins by examining the current
food security situation and the serious challenges
for Africa in the coming decades. Chapters 2, 3,
and 4 discuss and analyze possible futures for
food and water resources in Africa, and the final
chapter presents conclusions. 
Food Security in Africa
While the definition of food security has evolved
over time (see Heidhues et al. 2004 for a more
detailed discussion), a food-secure household is
generally described today as one that can reliably
obtain food of adequate quality and quantity to
support a healthy and active life for all members
of the household. Food security is influenced by
many factors, including poverty, consistent access
to food, nutrition, food production, the availability
of resources, and coping strategies. Food avail-
ability is crucial to food security, but it is not the
only factor necessary for a household to be food
secure. Even when production levels are sufficient
to meet demand in a given region, households
remain food insecure if they do not have the
income or resources to purchase or produce the
food they require. Consistent access to food is
also important; smallholder farmers can often pro-
duce enough food for their households following
the harvest, but they may struggle with food short-
ages at other times of the year (Benson 2004).  
Food security in Africa has substantially wors-
ened since 1970. Although recent data show that
the proportion of malnourished individuals in Sub-
Saharan Africa fell slightly from 35 percent in
1990–92 to 33 percent in 1999–2001, a longer-
term perspective reveals that this share has
remained within the 33–35 percent range since
around 1970. Even more discouraging, the
absolute number of malnourished people in Africa
has increased substantially with population
growth, from around 88 million in 1970 to an esti-
mate of over 200 million in 1999–2001 (FAO
2003). This record is in stark contrast to that of
other developing regions such as South and East
Asia, which have made significant strides in com-
bating malnutrition over the same time frame.
The aggregate numbers, however, conceal
considerable variation across the African conti-
nent. During the 1990s the proportion of mal-
nourished people declined in all African regions
except Central Africa, where it increased from 35
percent in 1990–92 to 58 percent in
1999–2001, driven primarily by an increase of
1.  Africa’s Food Security Challenge
144 percent in the Democratic Republic of Congo.
Some progress has been made in the other Sub-
Saharan regions, particularly in West Africa,
where the rate of malnutrition fell from 21 percent
in 1990–92 to 15 percent in 1999–2001. In
Benin, Ghana, and Nigeria, in particular, both the
percentage and the number of malnourished peo-
ple have consistently declined over the past 20
years (InterAcademy Council 2004). Both East
and southern Africa have made some progress in
reducing the percentage of undernourished peo-
ple; nevertheless, around 40 percent of the popu-
lations of both these regions are still malnourished.
Not surprisingly, North Africa has a much lower
proportion of malnourished people than the rest of
the continent, at 4 percent in 1999–2001 (FAO
2003).
Another indicator of food insecurity is the pro-
portion of undernourished children in a region.
This indicator has also shown an increasing trend
in Africa over the past 30 years, from around 27
percent in the 1970s to over 33 percent more
recently (InterAcademy Council 2004). This trend
is striking, because Africa is the only developing
region where the number of malnourished children
has been increasing. Again, there is variation
across the continent, with some countries faring
much worse than others. In some Sub-Saharan
African countries, including Burundi, Eritrea,
Ethiopia, Madagascar, and Niger, the prevalence
of undernourishment in children under five years
old is over 40 percent (FAO 2003). Even worse,
many countries in Africa with high rates of child-
hood malnutrition have shown increasing trends
(InterAcademy Council 2004). 
Challenges Facing African Food
Security
The challenges Africa faces in building food secu-
rity include physical factors, such as climate,
geography, and poor resource endowments; polit-
ical factors, such as lack of sound governance,
infrastructure, and public-private partnerships,
and the need for political reform; and socioeco-
nomic factors, such as HIV/AIDS, poverty, gender
inequality and lack of empowerment of women,
and low water availability. The most daunting of
these challenges are discussed below.
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Box 1—African regions within IMPACT
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) 
• Central and western SSA: Benin, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Comoros, Congo
Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea,
Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo
• Eastern SSA: Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda
• Nigeria
• Northern SSA: Burkina Faso, Chad, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Somalia,
and Sudan
• Southern SSA: Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique,
Namibia, Reunion, Swaziland, Zambia, and Zimbabwe
West Asia and North Africa (WANA)
• Egypt
• Turkeya
• Other WANA: Algeria, Cyprus, Iran, Iraq, Jordon, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Saudi
Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen
a Results for Turkey (part of West Asia) are not presented in this paper except in cases where data aggregation pre-
cludes their exclusion from West Asia/North Africa. These instances are noted where relevant.3
Lack of Sound Governance
Poor governance is a major issue in many African
countries, and one that has serious repercussions
for long-term food security. Problems such as cor-
ruption, collusion, and nepotism can significantly
inhibit the capacity of governments to promote
development efforts. Corruption is perceived to be
significant in many African countries. Transparency
International’s Corruption Perception Index, for
example, rates 8 countries in Africa
1 among the
top 20 most corrupt countries worldwide
(Transparency International 2003). Corruption
and other governance problems are also often
correlated with conflict, and governance-related
conflicts are often linked with hunger and food
security, both as a cause and as an effect (Messer
and Cohen 2004). This tendency was substantiat-
ed by a study conducted by Estache and Kouassi
(2002) that showed that high levels of inefficiency,
including inaccessibility and unavailability of
resources, are linked with weak governance and
institutions. 
Long-term peace and security—absent in
many African countries—are crucial to develop-
ment (Zhang 2004). Further, the political and
legal frameworks that enable development
through strong institutions, community participa-
tion and empowerment, social equity and justice,
and government accountability are preconditions
for the success of agricultural development strate-
gies. Local and regional farmer organizations are
a key component, for example, in facilitating com-
munication and information exchange, and in
encouraging the adoption of appropriate methods
and technologies. Sound governance can inhibit
conflict and allow the prioritization of appropriate
development strategies, including support for a
strong agricultural sector. All countries depend on
sound governance for sustainable agricultural
development, but different countries take different
measures to ensure sound governance, according
to their individual country conditions (see
Paarlberg 2002 for further discussion of gover-
nance and food security).
HIV/AIDS
Africa has absorbed the brunt of the HIV/AIDS
epidemic, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa,
where AIDS is the leading cause of adult mortali-
ty and morbidity. In 2003, an estimated 26.6 mil-
lion people were living with HIV in Africa, and
another 2.3 million people died of AIDS (UNAIDS
2003). In addition to its obvious health, econom-
ic, and social impacts, the disease has serious
impacts on food security and nutrition. Since AIDS
strikes the most productive age group (15- to 50-
year-olds), when family members fall ill or die from
the virus, households are less able to produce or
buy food, assets are depleted for medical or funer-
al costs, and children are frequently left without
adults to care for them. Those who are infected
often die before they can pass on crucial farming
knowledge and expertise to the next generation, a
situation that has lasting effects on agricultural pro-
duction. The Food and Agriculture Organization
of the United Nations (FAO) estimates that by
2020 the epidemic will claim the lives of 20 per-
cent or more of the population working in agricul-
ture in many southern African countries.
Moreover, more than two-thirds of the total popu-
lation of the 25 most-affected countries resides in
rural areas, affecting agricultural production as
well as farm and domestic labor supplies (FAO
2000a, 2004a). And because women in
Southern Africa are a major source of agricultural
labor, food production can be reduced by up to
60 percent in HIV-infected households when
women’s time and energy are diverted to care for
family members infected with HIV (Oxfam
International and Save the Children 2002). 
Households must often switch from the pro-
duction of more nutritious, labor-intensive crops,
such as maize, to less labor-intensive root crops
that provide poor nutrition. Lack of resources also
makes it more difficult for HIV-affected households
to supplement their diet through the purchase of
more nutritious and varied foods. The prevalence
of stunting, for example, is greater among
orphans in AIDS-affected households. In addition,
1 Including North and Sub-Saharan Africa.malnutrition increases family members’ susceptibil-
ity to HIV (for example, through transference from
mother to baby), creating a vicious cycle that sup-
ports the progression of the virus (Haddad and
Gillespie 2001). The effect of malnutrition is fur-
ther exacerbated because HIV-infected individuals
actually have greater nutritional requirements than
the rest of the population; they require up to 50
percent more protein and 15 percent more calo-
ries (Haddad and Gillespie 2001).
Soil Infertility
Soil quality in Africa varies widely, ranging from
very old, weathered, and leached rocks to soils
inherently low in nutrients because of their clay
and organic matter content (DFID 2002). In Sub-
Saharan Africa soil quality is classified as degrad-
ed on about 72 percent of arable land and 31
percent of pastureland. In addition to natural nutri-
ent deficiencies in the soil, soil fertility is declining
by the year through “nutrient mining,” whereby
nutrients are removed over the harvest period and
lost through leaching, erosion, or other means.
Nutrient levels have declined over the past 30
years, resulting in low levels of minerals like nitro-
gen, phosphorus, and potassium.
2 Some studies
have shown that depletion rates for these three
nutrients are greater than 60 kilograms per
hectare per year for many countries and sites
(Smaling, Nandwa, and Janssen 1997; De Jager
et al. 1998; van den Bosch et al. 1998;
Wortmann and Kaizzi 1998; Nkonya et al.
2003). Arable land declined by 24.5 percent per
capita in Africa between 1980 and 1993, which
is 1.3 times the global average of 18 percent
(UNU–INRA/World Bank 1999). This severe soil
fertility depletion and erosion affects both margin-
al and high-quality rainfed lands. Expansion of
agricultural lands into marginal areas also con-
tributes to degradation of soil fertility.  
Several studies point to possible causes of soil
fertility depletion in Africa (Pender, Place, and
Ehui 1999; UNU–IRA/World Bank 1999; Barrett
et al. 2002). Some of the factors most commonly
mentioned include the limited adoption of inor-
ganic fertilizer or organic fertilizer replenishment
strategies; the limited adoption of soil and water
conservation measures; use of heavy machinery
on soils with weak soil structure; the declining use
and length of fallow periods; the expansion of
agricultural production into marginal and fragile
areas, such as cultivation on steep slopes or in
arid areas without proper anti-erosion measures;
the use of animal dung and crop residues as fuel
rather than as soil amendments; and the removal
of vegetation through overgrazing, logging, devel-
opment, and domestic use. Soil fertility depletion
can also be related to many socioeconomic, insti-
tutional, and policy-related factors. Rapid popula-
tion growth, limited access to agriculture-related
technical assistance, and lack of knowledge about
profitable soil fertility management practices can
lead to expansion into less-favored lands. Access
to fertilizer can also be constrained by (1) market
liberalization and trade policies that increase fer-
tilizer prices relative to commodity prices; (2) lim-
ited access to markets and infrastructure; (3) limit-
ed development of output, input, and credit mar-
kets; and (4) poverty and cash constraints that
limit farmers’ ability to purchase fertilizer and
other inputs and cause them to focus on the short
term (Pender, Place, and Ehui 1999). 
A number of approaches have been adopted
to deal with soil infertility in Sub-Saharan Africa.
These approaches include organic farming, high
external input agriculture, low external input sus-
tainable agriculture, and integrated soil fertility
management (Pender and Mertz 2004; Martin
1999; Makokha et al. 2001; Kirchmann and
Bergstrom 2001). Pender and Mertz (2004)
argue that a pragmatic approach to the problem
is needed, and no single approach will likely suc-
ceed because of the diverse contexts of Sub-
Saharan Africa.
4
2 For an estimated 1 million square kilometers of cultivated land, the rates were 660 kilograms per hectare for nitrogen, 75
kilograms per hectare for phosphorus, and 450 kilograms per hectare for potassium. In contrast, farms in North America have
actually increased the average nutrient level per hectare: up to 2,000 kilograms for nitrogen, 700 kilograms for phosphorus,
and 1,000 kilograms for potassium over the same period (UNU–INRA/World Bank 1999).Poverty
The history of poverty in Africa is punctuated by
systematic marginalization by colonial powers,
chronically poor resource endowments at both
household and regional levels, and the vagaries
of climate and geography, from massive
droughts and floods to extreme remoteness.
Instability due to continuing political, ethnic, and
armed conflicts further entrenches parts of Africa
in a cycle of chronic poverty and food insecurity.
Poverty in Africa has also been affected histori-
cally by unfavorable trade policies and the exter-
nal debt burdens held by many African nations.
Lack of government investments in social services
and infrastructure has hindered economic devel-
opment, thus adding to mounting poverty levels.  
Poverty has serious effects on food and nutri-
tion security. It contributes to poor agricultural pro-
ductivity, as many African farmers cannot afford to
purchase inputs such as fertilizer, pesticides, and
improved seeds, which would help to increase
productivity. Additionally, poverty reduces the
ability of poor consumers to purchase the food
required to maintain a healthy and productive life.
Per capita consumption of food has actually
declined in recent years in some African regions. 
According to a traditional measure of poverty
(the number of people living on less than US$1 per
day), 163.6 million people in Sub-Saharan Africa
lived below the poverty line in 1981, and the num-
ber increased to 226.8 million in 1990 and 315.8
million in 2001. The poverty estimates also
increased in percentage terms, with 41.6 percent
below the poverty line in 1981, 44.6 percent in
1990, and 46.9 percent in 2001 (World Bank
2004b). 
Although these traditional measures of pover-
ty are commonly used, many in the development
community have supported measures such as the
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) that use a
complex set of conditions as a yardstick in assess-
ing the entire living situation of poor people.
Many African nations have fully committed to
poverty reduction strategies (UNECA 2003) that
model the MDGs established by the Millennium
Declaration of the United Nations, although these
country strategies are not quite as ambitious
(World Bank 2003b). Though poverty is still a
much more complicated problem than quantitative
indicators can represent (UNDP 2003; World
Bank 2001a, 2001b, 2003a), the MDG targets
were established in an effort to address the reali-
ty of poverty (and the experience of the world’s
poor) more comprehensively than in the past
(Table 1). The MDG indicators and targets provide
a means of measuring trends and improvements in
the areas of income, hunger, education, gender
equality, health, the environment, and access to
opportunities for development.
Poor Infrastructure 
Infrastructure is one of the key inputs to more rapid
agricultural development in Africa. Several studies
have shown the aggregate-level links between
poverty, growth, and rural capital-intensive infra-
structure in Africa and other developing regions,
including Lipton and Ravallion (1995), Jimenez
(1995), and Van de Walle (1996). The impact of
specific infrastructure components, such as rural
roads, telephones, or electricity, on poverty allevi-
ation and growth has been documented in Howe
(1984); Binswanger, Khandker, and Rosenzweig
(1993); Jacoby (1998)/ and Lebo and Schelling
(2001).   
Renkow, Hallstrom, and Karanja (2004) esti-
mated the fixed transaction costs (those not
dependent on commercialized volume) that hinder
subsistence farmers’ access to product markets in
Kenya. They found out that high transaction costs
are equivalent to a value-added tax of approxi-
mately 15 percent, illustrating the potential for
raising producer welfare with effective infrastruc-
ture investments. Another study in Uganda by
Smith et al. (2001) shows that the rehabilitation of
roads increases labor opportunities in the service
sector, possibly leading to poverty reduction. In
addition, road, rail, and telecommunications are
important determinants of bilateral trade flow.
Limão and Venables (1999) found that improving
destination infrastructure by one standard devia-
tion reduces transport costs by an amount equiva-
lent to a reduction of 6,500 kilometers at sea or
1,000 kilometers of overland travel. Results of
their study demonstrated that most of Africa’s poor
5trade performance can be accounted for by poor
infrastructure. Moreover, lack of adequate infra-
structure in much of Sub-Saharan Africa impedes
more productive agriculture.
Torero and Chowdhury (2005) show that Sub-
Saharan Africa has continued to lag significantly
behind other regions in infrastructure investments,
including paved roads, telephone lines, and elec-
tricity production. Less than half of the population in
Sub-Saharan Africa has access to safe drinking
water (Fishbein 2001), and the availability of clean
water may affect child mortality rates (Galiani,
Gertler, and Schargrodsky 2003) as well as the
attainment of universal primary education for girls
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Goals Targets
1. Eradicate extreme poverty   
and hunger
1.   Halve the proportion of people whose income is less than $1 a day
2.   Halve the proportion of people who suffer from hunger
2. Achieve universal primary 
education
3.   Ensure that children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be able to 
complete a full course of primary schooling
3. Promote gender equality 
and empower women
4.   Eliminate gender disparity in all levels of education
4. Reduce child mortality 5.   Reduce by two-thirds the under-five-year-old mortality rate
5. Improve maternal health 6.   Reduce by three-quarters the maternal mortality ratio
6. Combat HIV/AIDS, 
malaria, and other disease
7.   Halt and reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS
8.   Halt and reverse the incidence of malaria and other major diseases
7. Ensure environmental 
sustainability
9.   Integrate the principles of sustainable development into country policies 
and reverse the loss of environmental resources
10. Halve the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking 
water and basic sanitation
11. Achieve a significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million 
slum dwellers
8. Develop a global partner-
ship for development
12. Develop further an open, rule-based, predictable, nondiscriminatory 
trading and financial system 
13. Address the special needs of the least developed countries 
14. Address the special needs of landlocked countries and small island 
developing states 
15. Deal comprehensively with the debt problems of developing countries 
through national and international measures in order to make debt 
sustainable in the long term 
16. In cooperation with developing countries, develop and implement 
strategies for decent and productive work for youth
17. In cooperation with pharmaceutical companies, provide access to 
affordable, essential drugs in developing countries
18. In cooperation with the private sector, make available the benefits of new 
technologies, especially information and communications
Source: UNSD 2004b.
Table 1—Millennium Development Goals and targets(Leipziger et al. 2003). The significant lags in infra-
structure have normally been attributed to geogra-
phy (diseases, internal distance, and sparsely pop-
ulated areas are a big obstacle) and to the poor ini-
tial condition of infrastructure in Africa. Unlike Asia
and Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa inherited a
highly dispersed and unevenly distributed infra-
structure from its colonial past. There was little
improvement of infrastructure, if any, during the
colonial era, and “in some important respects, it
can even be said that colonial policy reinforced the
handicaps of SSA [Sub-Saharan Africa]” (Platteau
1996, 200). The limited infrastructure that was built
during that era was driven by the objective of con-
necting natural resources to export markets. The rest
of the continent was virtually ignored, and this
skewed distribution of infrastructure was perpetuat-
ed even after independence. Ensuring adequate
infrastructure is an essential challenge for agricul-
tural development in Africa. 
Limited Access to Developed-Country
Markets and Difficulties with Economic
Liberalization
Economic liberalization in Africa has had mixed
results. The economic crisis of the 1980s induced
most African countries to accept long-run structural
adjustment programs representing a wide range of
market liberalization and public sector reforms,
including major agricultural sector reforms.
Reforms focused on liberalizing input and output
prices, eliminating regulatory controls on input and
output markets, and restructuring public enterprises
(including removing the regulatory functions of
marketing boards) (Rosegrant et al. 2001). These
reforms were implemented with the idea that intro-
ducing market forces to the agricultural sector
would immediately lead to economic growth.
Reforms to food crop markets were more compre-
hensive than reforms to export crop markets in cen-
tral and western Africa, and actual reforms in
southern and eastern Africa have been limited,
with state trading and price bands remaining in
effect in a number of countries, including Kenya,
Malawi, and Zimbabwe (Kherallah et al. 2000).   
State-owned enterprises in Africa continue to
dominate fertilizer, seed, and agrochemical mar-
kets regardless of the penetration of some multi-
nationals and private traders. Hence input market
reforms are significantly less comprehensive
throughout the region compared to the rest of the
world. Most reform efforts have been partially
reversed in the face of resistance by entrenched
groups. These entrenched groups want to keep
their access to rents and privileges, while most
regional governments lack strong political legiti-
macy and are unwilling or unable to generate
solid indigenous support for major reform efforts.
Donor demands and prescriptions tend to domi-
nate policymaking (Kherallah et al. 2000). 
The global trade environment has also caused
serious problems for African agriculture. Support
policies and border protection of the wealthy coun-
tries of the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD), valued at
hundreds of billions of dollars each year, cause
harm to agriculture in developing countries.
Estimates utilizing general equilibrium models
show that the increase in world prices from
removal of OECD protection will lead to larger
agricultural production in developing countries.
Beghin, Roland-Holst, and Van der Mensbrugghe
(2002) estimate that removal of OECD protection
could boost rural value-added in low- and middle-
income countries by US$60 billion per year. Other
studies (Tokarick, Sutton, and Yang 2002; Tokarick
2003) arrive at lower numbers, estimating that
OECD market access barriers and subsidy policies
cost developing countries as a whole US$8 billion
in overall welfare annually (0.13 percent of devel-
oping-country gross domestic product [GDP]).
Diao, Diaz-Bonilla, and Robinson (2003) estimate
that OECD subsidies and border protection reduce
agricultural exports from the developing world by
US$37.2 billion (25.3 percent) annually.
Agricultural value-added among developing coun-
tries is reduced by US$23.0 billion annually, while
national welfare of developing countries is
repressed by US$9.4 billion. For specific countries
and specific commodities, the effects can be criti-
cal, as in the case of cotton for the rural poor in a
number of African countries. Using household sur-
vey data, Minot and Daniels (2002) find that a 20
percent drop in world cotton prices, as might be
due to developed-country subsidies, would
7increase poverty in Benin, a country dependent on
cotton exports, by 4 percentage points through
direct and indirect effects on rural incomes. This
increase is equivalent to a 10 percent rise in the
population living under the poverty line.
In addition, GATT (General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade), TBT (Technical Barriers to
Trade), SPS (Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary
Agreements), the HACCP (Hazard Analysis and
Critical Control Points) system, and other trade
policies make it difficult for Africa and most devel-
oping countries to comply and penetrate the inter-
national markets, particularly those of the devel-
oped world. Compliance with these trade policies
entails economic costs for export producers from
developing countries, increasing the likelihood
that their products will only reach the domestic
market and that economic growth from the inter-
national market will be restricted. 
Limited Irrigation 
Some experts argue that the full potential of irriga-
tion in Africa has not yet been completely exhaust-
ed, claiming that of the 42.5 million hectares (ha)
of potential irrigated land, only 30 percent (12.7
million ha) is being irrigated (InterAcademy Council
2004). FAO (1997) points out that this prospective
irrigated area is not being exploited because more
than 60 percent of the area is located in humid
regions, with almost 25 percent in the Congo Basin
alone. These areas have excessive rainfall, and as
a result irrigation is only supplementary.   
Unlike in Asia, investment costs in Africa are
substantial, ranging from US$5,000 to
US$25,000 per ha (InterAcademy Council 2004).
Costs of water development have been increasing
for medium- and large-scale irrigation, with the cost
of full water control at US$8,300 per ha in Sub-
Saharan Africa compared with US$6,800 per ha
in North Africa in 1995 dollars (FAO 1995). As a
result of the high indirect costs of social infrastruc-
ture, including roads, houses, electric grids, and
public service utilities, the average irrigation cost in
Sub-Saharan Africa has risen to US$18,300 per
ha (Rosegrant, Cai, and Cline 2002). 
Aside from the prohibitive irrigation costs, irri-
gation in Africa often generates low benefits
because of (1) inherently difficult agroclimatic and
agronomic conditions, (2) lack of appropriate crop
varieties and low use of complementary inputs
(such as fertilizer), (3) labor scarcity leading to
high labor costs and labor bottlenecks at peak sea-
sons, (4) insecure land tenure and water rights that
reduce incentives to invest in and maintain irriga-
tion facilities, (5) problems in coordinating techni-
cal and socioeconomic aspects of irrigation and
irrigated farming, (6) poor operation and mainte-
nance of irrigation systems, and (7) overvalued
exchange rates as a disincentive to agricultural
production (Rosegrant and Perez 1997). 
The factors mentioned have made Africa a pre-
dominantly rainfed agricultural region. Of 1.101
billion ha of agricultural area in Africa, only 1.15
percent (12.68 million ha) was irrigated in 2000
(InterAcademy Council 2004). In 1995 the total
cereal area relying on rainfall for water supply
ranged from 78 percent in West Asia and North
Africa (WANA) to 96 percent in Sub-Saharan
Africa. Rosegrant et al. (2002) project rainfed
area to remain relatively stable until 2025, with 77
percent of area remaining rainfed in WANA and
95 percent in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Low Agricultural Research Investment
Analysis of global public agricultural research
expenditures showed a declining annual growth
rate in both developed and developing countries
from 1976 to 1996 (Table 2) (Pardey and Beintema
2001). The poorest performance is in Sub-Saharan
Africa, where public agricultural investment grew at
only 1.5 percent per year during this period (one-
third the rate of developing countries as a whole),
and actually declined in the first half of the 1990s.
As a result of this slow growth, annual expenditures
on agricultural research were only 25 percent high-
er in Sub-Saharan Africa in 1995 than in 1976,
while they nearly tripled in other developing coun-
tries as a whole. 
Another measure of agricultural research inten-
sity is to estimate agricultural research expenditures
as a percentage of agricultural GDP. Both devel-
oped and developing countries had an increasing
percentage of public research expenditure as a
share of agricultural GDP from 1976 to 1995. All
8regions of the world showed an increasing share
except for Sub-Saharan Africa, where public
research expenditure as a share of agricultural
GDP is declining, implying a reduction of govern-
ment support to agricultural R&D. African govern-
ments have cut their support because of pressure to
reduce spending in general. Declines may also be
due to a shift in priorities, with governments ques-
tioning the value of research and extension given
the lack of improvement in agricultural productivity
in Africa. Donor assistance to agricultural research
has likewise declined as a result of priorities shift-
ing from agricultural production to environmental
protection, health, education, water and sanita-
tion, and other areas. 
Moreover, in contrast to other developing
regions of the world, the private sector in Africa is
not increasing its research efforts as government
spending declines. Beintema and Stads (2004)
showed that private sector investment in agricul-
tural R&D in developing countries during 2000
was insignificant. Private sector investment
amounted to 50 percent of total agricultural R&D
in developed countries in 1995, compared with
only 5.5 percent in developing countries
(Beintema and Stads 2004). In Africa the private
sector plays an exceptionally small role in funding
agricultural research, accounting for only 2 per-
cent of total agricultural research spending. An
increase in this contribution is highly unlikely
because the potential profits from conducting
research on important crops in Africa are not suf-
ficiently high to attract the interest of either domes-
tic or international private firms (NEPAD 2002). 
The weakness in research in Africa extends to
agricultural biotechnology. Advancement in genet-
ic modifications or utilization of genetically modi-
fied organisms (GMOs) as a response to environ-
mental stresses and food insecurity in the devel-
oping countries hold high potential to address
economic and environmental issues. Atanassov et
al. (2004) showed the current regulatory status,
approvals, and testing of GMOs in 16 developing
countries from Africa, Asia, and Latin America.
Among the four participating African countries,
South Africa has five commercial GM approvals
for planting cotton, maize, and soybeans, while
Egypt, Kenya, and Zimbabwe have no events at
all. In addition, South Africa has approved 172
field trials for GMOs, while Kenya has approved
2. Egypt and Zimbabwe have approved no field
trials of GMO crops. 
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Table 2—Annual growth rate (%) of global public agricultural research expenditures, 
1976-96
Region 1976–81 1981–86 1986–91 1991–96 1976–96
Developing countries 7.0 3.9 3.9 3.6 4.5
Sub-Saharan Africa 1.7 1.4 0.5 –0.2 1.5
China 7.8 8.9 2.8 5.5 5.2
Asia and Pacific,
excluding China
8.2 5.1 7.5 4.4 6.5
Latin America and the
Caribbean
9.5 0.5 0.4 2.9 2.5
Middle East and North
Africa
7.4 4.0 4.2 3.5 4.8
Developed countries 2.5 1.9 2.2 0.2 1.9
Total 4.5 2.9 3.0 2.0 3.2
Source: Pardey and Beintema 2001.
Note: See Pardey and Beintema 2001 for further explanation on computation of estimates.The future projections generated for this paper are
based on results from IMPACT for food supply,
demand, net trade, and malnutrition and from the
associated IMPACT–WATER model for water
resource projections (see Boxes 2 and 3 for more
information on methodologies). While the baseline
years for IMPACT and IMPACT–WATER are 1997
and 1995, respectively, projections in the analysis
for both models extend to 2025. Results are pre-
sented for five regions of Sub-Saharan Africa and
two regions of West Asia/North Africa, as outlined
in Box 1 on page 2.
3 Consistent assumptions for
model drivers are used here for the business as
usual scenario to achieve comparable results for the
two models (see Box 4 for summaries of the sce-
narios). In this section we focus on the results for the
main staple commodities, including cereals and
roots and tubers. 
2. Three Scenarios for the Future: Business as
Usual, Pessimistic, and Vision
10
3 The current version of IMPACT aggregates “Other WANA” as one region. In addition to the North African countries of
Algeria, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia, this region also includes Cyprus, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia,
Syria, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. This leads to results that are significantly higher than for North Africa alone, which
represents around 31 percent of Other WANA meat production, 32 percent of Other WANA root and tuber production, and
24 percent of Other WANA cereal production. 
Box 2—IMPACT Methodology
a
IMPACT is a representation of a competitive world agricultural market for 32 crop and livestock commodities,
including all cereals, soybeans, roots and tubers, meats, milk, eggs, oils, oilcakes/meals, sugar/sweeteners,
fruits/vegetables, and fish. It is specified as a set of 36 country or regional submodels, within each of which
supply, demand, and prices for agricultural commodities are determined. The country and regional agricul-
tural submodels are linked through trade, a specification that highlights the interdependence of countries and
commodities in global agricultural markets. The model uses a system of supply and demand elasticities incor-
porated into a series of linear and nonlinear equations, to approximate the underlying production and demand
functions. World agricultural commodity prices are determined annually at levels that clear international mar-
kets. Demand is a function of prices, income, and population growth. Growth in crop production in each coun-
try is determined by crop prices and the rate of productivity growth. The model is written in the General
Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS) programming language. The solution of the system of equations is
achieved using the Gauss–Seidel method algorithm. This procedure minimizes the sum of net trade at the inter-
national level and seeks a world market price for a commodity that satisfies market-clearing conditions. 
IMPACT generates annual projections for crop area, yield, and production; crop demand for food,
feed, and other uses; crop prices and trade; and livestock numbers, yield, production, demand, prices, and
trade. The current baseline year is 1997 (using a three-year average of 1996–98) and the model incor-
porates FAOSTAT data (FAO various years) on commodity, income, and population; projections from the
World Bank (World Bank 1998, 2000a, 2000b) and the UN (United Nations 1998); a system of supply
and demand elasticities from literature reviews and expert estimates; and rates for malnutrition from UN-
ACC/SCN (1996), WHO (1997), and calorie-malnutrition relationships developed by Smith and Haddad
(2000). The version of the model used here projects results to the year 2025. Additional information about
the model and its formulation can be found in Rosegrant, Meijer, and Cline (2002).
aThe modeling results presented in this paper are not directly comparable with those in von Braun et al. (2005) because
the two analyses use different versions of the IMPACT model.  Please refer to the technical appendix of von Braun et al. for
specific details of the model and scenario specifications used in that analysis. 11
Box 3—IMPACT–WATER Methodology
The IMPACT–WATER integrated water-food modeling framework developed at IFPRI (Rosegrant and Cai
2000) is applied to assess the current situation and plausible future options of irrigation water supply
and food security, primarily on a global scale. This model simulates the relationships among water avail-
ability and demand, food supply and demand, international food prices, and trade at regional and
global levels. The world is divided into 69 spatial units, including single river basins in China, India and
the United States, and aggregated river basins in other countries and regions. For each spatial unit,
crop-wise water demand and supply are calculated and then incorporated into separate rainfed and
irrigated crop area and yield functions. Eight food crops are considered: rice, wheat, maize, other
coarse grains, soybeans, potatoes, sweet potatoes, and cassava/other roots and tubers. For more infor-
mation on the IMPACT–WATER methodology, see Rosegrant, Cai, and Cline (2002).
Scenario name Abbreviation Description
Projection 
period
Business as usual BAU Current trends and existing plans for food policy, management, and
investment continue over the projection period, including declining
agricultural investments by international donors and national govern-
ments to 2025.
1997–2025
Pessimistic PES Trends in agricultural production and nutrition deteriorate by compari-
son with BAU, including declines in national and international invest-
ments affecting HIV/AIDS, agricultural research, education, and so
on; declines in agricultural productivity, yield growth, and consequent-
ly GDP; and deterioration of social factors, such as female education
levels, access to clean water, labor productivity, and life expectancy.
1997–2025
Vision VIS Current trends and existing plans for food policy, management, and
investment improve considerably to 2025, enabling increased labor
productivity through higher investment in HIV/AIDS prevention and
treatment, higher levels of education, and strengthened agricultural




BAU conditions, combined with increased effective rainfall 
(in rainfed areas only) incorporating the following three variables.
(HIER) HIER–1 Effective rainfall use in all basins and countries increases by 10 per-
cent in 2025 over actual 1995 rainfall levels. 
1995–2025
HIER–2 HIER–1 plus low investments in irrigation. 1995–2025
HIER–3 Effective 2025 rainfall use in Sub-Saharan African basins and coun-




RMM BAU conditions, combined with improved rural infrastructure, market-
ing, and communications, which decreases marketing margins and
increases productivity. 
1997–2025




FTL Producer and consumer subsidy equivalent prices (PSEs and CSEs,
respectively) between domestic and international prices are completely




PRO PSE and CSE values increase by 50 percent in all African countries in




ATL PSEs and CSEs respectively between domestic and international prices
are completely removed in African countries only, and base line pro-
tection levels are maintained in all other countries and regions. 
1997–2025
Box 4—Scenario Names, Abbreviations, and DescriptionsBusiness as Usual Scenario
The  business as usual scenario (henceforth BAU)
assumes a continuation of current trends and exist-
ing plans in food policy, management, and invest-
ment. Investments by international donors and
national governments in the agricultural sector con-
tinue to decline throughout the projection period.
This sluggish investment trend, combined with spo-
radic policy reform, leads to slow progress in meet-
ing the major challenges facing African agriculture.  
Under this scenario, per capita kilocalorie
consumption in Sub-Saharan Africa is projected to
increase from 2,231 kilocalories per capita per
day in 1997 to 2,526 kilocalories in 2025, lag-
ging behind the rest of the world (Table 3). Despite
increasing kilocalorie consumption, the number of
malnourished children under the age of five
increases from 32.7 million in 1997 to 38.3 mil-
lion in 2025, although this absolute increase rep-
resents a decline in percentage terms from 32.8
percent in 1997 to 28.2 percent in 2025 (Tables
4 and 5). Sub-Saharan Africa is the only region
where absolute numbers of malnourished children
increase under BAU, and, while increases occur in
several Sub-Saharan African regions under this
scenario, northern Sub-Saharan Africa experi-
ences a particularly sharp increase, from 10.2 mil-
lion malnourished children under five years old in
1997 to 13.8 million in 2025 (a 35 percent
increase). Central and western Sub-Saharan
Africa also show a fairly sharp increase in the
numbers of malnourished children, at about 20
percent (from 6.9 million in 1997 to 8.3 million in
2025). The trend in malnutrition is more positive in
West Asia/North Africa;
4 the percentage of mal-
nourished children decreases under BAU from
13.2 percent in 1997 to 7.7 percent in 2025. It
should be noted, however, that whereas the per-
centage of malnourished children declines slightly
in all regions between 1997 and 2025, the pro-
jected figures do not come close to meeting the
MDG target of halving the percentage of people
suffering from hunger by 2015, and, equally, tar-
gets for 2025 fall far short of being met under this
scenario.
As shown above, food security in Africa does
not improve substantially to 2025 under BAU. A
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Table 3—Projected per capita kilocalories available in Africa under the 
business as usual scenario, 1997, 2015, 2020, and 2025
Region/Country
Baseline
1997 2015 2020 2025
Northern Sub-Saharan Africa 2,175 2,253 2,293 2,346
Central and western Sub-
Saharan Africa 2,175 2,309 2,378 2,458
Southern Sub-Saharan Africa 2,022 2,162 2,225 2,305
Eastern Sub-Saharan Africa 1,999 2,110 2,167 2,233
Nigeria 2,759 3,073 3,203 3,356
All Sub-Saharan Africa 2,231 2,377 2,444 2,526
West Asia/North Africaa 3,059 3,175 3,209 3,238
Developing countries 2,668 2,935 3,001 3,058
Source: IFPRI IMPACT projections 2004.
aIn this table, West Asia/North Africa includes Egypt, Other West Asia/North Africa, and Turkey.
Available kilocalories per capita per day
Projected
4 The child malnutrition figures for West Asia/North Africa include data for Turkey as well as Egypt and Other WANA. As a
result, the number of malnourished children is higher than would be the case for North Africa alone.Table 4—Projected number of malnourished children in Africa under the 
business as usual scenario, 1997, 2015, 2020, and 2025
Region/Country
Baseline
1997 2015 2020 2025
Northern Sub-Saharan Africa 10.2  14.6 13.8 13.8
Central and western Sub-
Saharan Africa 6.9 8.5 8.6 8.3
Southern Sub-Saharan Africa 4.0 4.4 4.3 4.2
Eastern Sub-Saharan Africa 4.6 5.8 5.2 5.0
Nigeria 6.9 7.9 7.4 7.1
All Sub-Saharan Africa 32.7 41.3 39.3 38.3
West Asia/North Africaa 5.9 4.7 4.1 3.6
Developing countries 166.3 135.4 132.2 124.1
Source: IFPRI IMPACT projections 2004.
aIn this table, West Asia/North Africa includes Egypt, Other West Asia/North Africa, and Turkey.
Number of malnourished children 
under five years old (millions)
Projected
Table 5—Projected percentage of malnourished children in Africa under the 
business as usual scenario, 1997, 2015, 2020, and 2025
Region/Country
Baseline
1997 2015 2020 2025
Northern Sub-Saharan Africa 40.0 37.9 37.1 36.3
Central and western Sub-
Saharan Africa 27.8 25.3 24.3 23.2
Southern Sub-Saharan Africa 26.9 23.9 22.6 21.6
Eastern Sub-Saharan Africa 27.6 25.8 24.9 24.2
Nigeria 39.1 35.2 33.6 32.3
All Sub-Saharan Africa 32.8 30.4 29.2 28.2
West Asia/North Africaa 13.2 9.6 8.6 7.7
Developing countries 31.4 26.0 24.7 23.5
Source: IFPRI IMPACT projections 2004.
aIn this table, West Asia/North Africa includes Egypt, Other West Asia/North Africa, and Turkey.
% of malnourished children
under five years old
Projected
13contributing factor to ongoing food insecurity under
this scenario is the expected modest growth in agri-
cultural production by historical standards to
2025. Between 1997 and 2025, BAU projects
annual African cereal production growth of 1.9
percent for wheat, 2.3 percent for maize, 2.4 per-
cent for other coarse grains, 2.5 percent for rice,
and 2.7 percent for roots and tubers (Table 6). The
projected 2.7 percent cereal production growth in
Sub-Saharan Africa is slightly less than the 3.6 per-
cent actual annual increase in production achieved
during 1982–97; projected annual root and tuber
production growth rates of 2.7 percent per year
also represent a decline from actual 1982–97
rates, which averaged 4.3 percent per year.
Under BAU, crop production in Africa contin-
ues to expand onto unused land. Area under cere-
al and root and tuber cultivation increases in Sub-
Saharan Africa over the projection period at rates
ranging from 27 percent in Nigeria to 40 percent
in central and western Sub-Saharan Africa,
although this expansion is slow by historic equiva-
lents (Table 7). Area increases in North Africa are
smaller, at 14.3 percent for Egypt and 12.9 per-
cent for Other WANA.
African cereal yield growth averages 1.4 per-
cent per year under BAU between 1997 and
2025. North African cereal yields grow at a lower
rate than in Sub-Saharan Africa, at 1.0 percent per
year in Egypt and 1.3 percent per year in Other
WANA. Cereal yield growth across Sub-Saharan
Africa is higher, however, averaging 1.7 percent
per year over the projection period, essentially
doubling the actual yield growth achieved during
1967–97 (Table 8). A number of considerations
and assumptions underlie these mildly optimistic
growth rates. Sub-Saharan African yields are very
low by other developing country standards, indi-
cating that significant growth should be possible if
countries in the region move toward appropriate
technologies, policies, and programs. According
to Boserupian theories of induced technological
innovation, growing population pressure can be
expected to lead to higher yield growth rates as
low-input agriculture increasingly ceases to be a
viable option (Boserup 1981). Under BAU, total







Nigeria 3.3 2.1 2.6 2.9 2.7
Northern Sub-Saharan Africa 2.6 2.1 2.7 2.9 2.7
Central and western Sub-
Saharan Africa 3.0 3.0 3.4 3.4 2.9
Southern Sub-Saharan Africa 2.8 2.4 3.4 2.8 2.4
Eastern Sub-Saharan Africa 3.7 2.4 3.0 2.6 2.8
All Sub-Saharan Africa 2.9 2.4 2.8 3.0 2.7
Egypt 1.6 1.6 0.7 1.5 2.3
Other West Asia/North Africa 1.9 2.0 1.2 1.7 2.2
All Africa 1.9 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.7
Source: IFPRI IMPACT projections 2004.
Note: The total for “All Africa” is slightly higher than the actual total for all the individual countries because the
IMPACT model includes some West Asian countries in the “Other West Asia/North Africa” region (Cyprus, Iran, Iraq,
Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen).
Production growth rates (% per year)
14Table 7—Projected cereal, root, and tuber area in Africa under the business 










Northern Sub-Saharan Africa 29.2 37.9 0.9 1.1
Central and western Sub-
Saharan Africa 10.2 14.3 6.0 8.3
Southern Sub-Saharan Africa 9.0 12.2 2.5 3.0
Eastern Sub-Saharan Africa 6.8 9.1 2.6 3.4
Nigeria 18.1 23.2 5.8 7.1
All Sub-Saharan Africa 73.1 96.7 17.8 22.9
Egypt 2.6 3.0 0.1 0.1
Other West Asia/North Africa 26.6 30.1 0.5 0.5
All Africa 102.4 129.9 18.3 23.5
Source: IFPRI IMPACT projections 2004.
Note: The total for “All Africa” is slightly higher than the actual total for all the individual countries because
the IMPACT model includes some West Asian countries in the “Other West Asia/North Africa” region





Table 8—Projected crop yield growth rates in Africa under the business as
usual scenario, 1997-2025
Region/Country All cereals Maize Rice
Cassava
and others
Northern Sub-Saharan Africa 1.7 1.3 1.9 2.0
Central and western Sub-
Saharan Africa
1.9 1.9 1.9 1.6
Southern Sub-Saharan Africa 1.5 1.3 2.1 1.7
Eastern Sub-Saharan Africa 1.6 1.5 1.7 1.9
Nigeria 1.6 1.5 2.0 1.8
All Sub-Saharan Africa 1.7 1.5 1.9 1.7
Egypt 1.0 1.1 1.3 1.0
Other West Asia/North Africa 1.3 1.2 1.5 2.3
All Africa 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.7
Source: IFPRI IMPACT projections 2004.
Note: The total for “All Africa” is slightly higher than the actual total for all the individual countries because
the IMPACT model includes some West Asian countries in the “Other West Asia/North Africa” region
(Cyprus, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen).
Crop yield growth rates, 1997–2025 (% per year)
15cereal and root and tuber harvested area in Sub-
Saharan Africa declines from 0.16 hectares per
capita in 1997 to 0.11 hectares per capita in
2025. Of course, higher population densities do
not guarantee rapid innovation. Even as popula-
tions throughout Sub-Saharan Africa are losing their
ability to practice shifting cultivation because of
high population densities, they also continue to
practice other elements of extensive cultivation,
including low levels of technological and capital
inputs, traditional land tenure and land husbandry
practices, and traditional methods of resource
acquisition (Cleaver and Schreiber 1994).
Moreover, harvested area grows at a slow rate in
most regions in the coming decades under BAU.
Considering that a high proportion of land suitable
for agricultural use is already being harvested—
together with other factors, such as urbanization,
slow growth in irrigation investment, and soil degra-
dation—additional growth of harvested area will
be hindered in the future. Declining real cereal
prices under this scenario also influence harvested
area expansion, ultimately making it unprofitable.
The slow rate of area expansion causes pro-
duction growth to come primarily from yield
improvements, which are also slow under this sce-
nario. Investments in agricultural research and rural
infrastructure continue to decline into the future,
compounding the decline in yield growth in many
regions around the world. Many of the successes
achieved in rice and wheat yields during the Green
Revolution make future yield gains for these crops
more difficult because many of the gains in recent
decades—such as increasing crop-planting density
through changes to plant architecture, raising the
weight of usable food product as a fraction of total
plant weight, introducing strains with greater fertil-
izer responsiveness, and improving management
practices—are not readily repeatable. Under BAU,
new investments in water harvesting and crop
breeding for rainfed environments continue to be
slow, leading to little improvement in rainfed yields.
While crucially important, an improved policy
framework that allows the market to operate freely
will not launch African agriculture on a strong and
sustainable yield growth path without proactive
measures at the national and international levels to
ensure more widespread diffusion of technological
solutions and more intensive input application
across the region. National governments must con-
tinue to pursue nondistortionary measures that stim-
ulate fertilizer use above the 1997 application rates
of only 8 kilograms per hectare of arable and per-
manent cropland (Byerlee and Heisey 1996).
While the removal of fertilizer subsidies during the
1980s and 1990s was necessary to stimulate pri-
vate sector participation in the market, the benefits
have not yet been realized because of a variety of
factors, including trade barriers, political indiffer-
ence, foreign exchange shortages, low crop prices,
and a lack of institutional and physical infrastructure
(World Bank 2000a). National governments must
encourage fertilizer use in high-potential areas, put
in place proper measures to ensure environmental
sustainability, and address the high cost of fertilizers
by lowering transport costs and raising scale-
economies of international purchasing and ship-
ment (Byerlee and Heisey 1996; Bumb and
Baanante 1996). Given that the total supply poten-
tial for the region is only 8.4 million metric tons
(with demand of 3.5 million metric tons in
1994/95), Sub-Saharan Africa will have to import
large quantities of fertilizer over the foreseeable
future, thus necessitating stable and timely supplies
of foreign exchange (Bumb and Baanante 1996). 
A number of researchers (Versteeg, Adegbola,
and Koudokpon 1993; Janssen 1993) have point-
ed to the suitability of labor-intensive techniques
such as legume rotations, animal manures, and
alley cropping as potential short-term fertilizer sub-
stitutes in cases of labor surplus (Byerlee and Heisey
1996). Such organic solutions are inadequate on
their own because of the high level of crop nutrients
required by much of Sub-Saharan Africa’s degrad-
ed soil base, but organic and synthetic solutions
have additive properties that could enhance overall
nutrient replacement and provide trade-offs
between capital and labor (Vanlauwe, Aihou, and
Houngnandan 2001). Some potential strategies
include the use of leguminous short-term and tree
fallows to increase nitrogen concentrations and
maximize potassium recycling (Sanchez et al.
2001). Becker and Johnson (1998) highlight the
effectiveness of site-specific, multipurpose cover
legumes as short-duration fallows capable of sus-
taining rice yields under intensified cropping, with
16use of these fallows in one study area increasing
rice yields by 29 percent above control levels. 
These alternative nutrient-replenishing practices
are generally site specific and highly knowledge
intensive, requirements that are problematic for
smallholders lacking significant management
capacity. Further research into how best to empow-
er farmers to carry out proper cropping systems
management is clearly required, and much of this
research will have to be publicly funded and per-
formed by researchers at the national level, since
private sector research capacity in Sub-Saharan
Africa is minimal. Areas in need of attention include
the development of nutrient management systems
for specific soils, low-cost soil rehabilitation tech-
niques, methods for incorporating perennial crops
in farming landscapes, and innovative incentive
structures to encourage long-term conservation of
forest and grazing land (Scherr 1999). 
Dynamic crop management programs involv-
ing extensive on-farm research have not traditional-
ly been a national priority in Sub-Saharan Africa,
with most governments preferring to place resources
behind relatively less complex and costly research
into improved germplasm, particularly high-yielding
maize varieties (Byerlee and Heisey 1996;
Dowswell, Paliwal, and Cantrell 1996). By the late
1990s, improved maize varieties were being grown
on approximately 40 percent of maize area in Sub-
Saharan Africa, but the lagging development of sus-
tainable management practices has kept yields well
below the developing world average (Byerlee and
Eicher 1997). Accumulated farming experience
simply cannot provide farmers with the knowledge
base necessary to effectively apply fertilizer, plant
high-yielding varieties with appropriate density,
and weed early once soil fertility is restored. As
maize production systems become increasingly sci-
ence based, it will be up to a variety of publicly and
internationally funded information disseminators to
enhance farmer knowledge, technical skills, and
managerial capacity (Dowswell, Paliwal, and
Cantrell 1996). IMPACT’s BAU projections assume
that modest investments in maize productivity will
be forthcoming, with annual maize yield growth
rates in Sub-Saharan Africa rising from a rate of
0.6 percent between 1982 and 1997 to a rate of
1.5 percent between 1997 and 2025 (Table 8). 
In addition to paying greater attention to crop-
ping systems, future research efforts must diversify
from a focus on maize to explore opportunities for
alternative crops such as cassava and rice that have
particular problems associated with African agroe-
cological conditions. Technological diffusion has
proven a major problem in Sub-Saharan Africa,
with Goldman and Block (1993) identifying a num-
ber of commodities for which there exist underuti-
lized high-yielding varieties, including cassava
(with potential yield increases of 50 percent on half
of currently planted area), sweet potato, and rice
(for both irrigated and mangrove environments)
(cited in Spencer 1994). Significant increases in
rice production will depend crucially on further irri-
gation development, although past experiences
with irrigated rice production have not been posi-
tive, and exploitable water supplies are limited. The
BAU scenario projects strong rice yield growth of
1.5 percent annually between 1997 and 2025 in
Africa, and a 1.9 percent growth in Sub-Saharan
Africa, representing a modest increase above the
growth achieved between 1982 and 1997. At this
rate of increase, African rice yields are projected to
reach 1.54 metric tons per hectare by 2025, sig-
nificantly lower than the projected developing
world average of 3.38 metric tons per hectare.
Under BAU, cassava yields also increase at a fairly
rapid annual rate of 1.7 percent in Sub-Saharan
Africa over the projection period, following actual
annual growth of 1.2 percent during 1982–97. At
this rate of increase, cassava yields reach 12.87
metric tons per hectare by 2025 under BAU, slight-
ly lower than the projected yield of 16.44 metric
tons per hectare in Latin America. 
The experience with maize in Sub-Saharan
Africa shows that small farmers will make use of
improved seeds and complementary inputs, provid-
ed the technology, infrastructure, and overall macro-
economic environment are appropriate. In order to
address the region-specific conditions, improved
technology packages need to place a premium on
efficient input use and maximizing returns to labor
and cash during early adoption. Above all, effec-
tive research must be embedded within an overall
framework for agricultural development that empha-
sizes smallholder commercialization, private sector
initiative at all levels, decentralized public partici-
17pation, trade, and poverty alleviation (World Bank
2000b). Alston et al. (2000) calculated the mean
rate of return to local research in Sub-Saharan
Africa at a very respectable 34.3 percent, despite
the finding that lack of staff continuity and breeding
strategies in many national programs have been
responsible for the widespread perception that
local research efforts have not been successful
(Alston et al. 2000; Byerlee and Heisey 1996).
These results indicate that local research and exten-
sion services have the capability to perform the
tasks required of them, but need to be stronger and
better funded if they are to provide consistent and
expanded services. 
Projections under BAU indicate burdensome,
yet manageable, agricultural import needs for
Africa in 2025. Net cereal imports are projected to
increase from 56.2 million metric tons in 1997 to
110.0 million metric tons in 2025 (Table 9). Central
and western Sub-Saharan Africa remains the major
net cereal-importing subregion in Sub-Saharan
Africa, with net imports increasing from 4.6 million
metric tons in 1997 to 9.7 million metric tons in
2025. Nigeria has the largest projected percent-
age increase in net imports under BAU, from 2.0
million metric tons in 1997 to 6.1 million metric tons
in 2025. Wheat remains the dominant African
cereal import, with net imports rising from 31.8 mil-
lion metric tons in 1997 to 55.9 million metric tons
in 2025. Maize has the sharpest increase in net
imports, however, from 10.4 million metric tons to
20.1 million metric tons.
The development challenges facing Africa are
clearly the most daunting of those facing any devel-
oping region. Concerted investment in agricultural
and human development will be necessary to over-
come these challenges over the next two decades.
However, pervasive poverty, mismanagement, and
corruption in the region—particularly in Sub-
Saharan Africa—have limited the scope for inter-
nally generated investment, while donor fatigue
and the perceived failures of much of the multilater-
al lending and bilateral aid in the past may limit the
availability of external funds. 
Fulfillment of the projected outcomes under
BAU would require total investment expenditures in


















Northern Sub-Saharan Africa –1.7 –4.7 –0.1 –0.5 –0.1 0.4 –0.4 –1.1
Central and western Sub-
Saharan Africa –1.9 -–4.9 –0.2 0.4 –0.2 0.1 –2.3 –5.3
Southern Sub-Saharan Africa –1.2 –2.4 –0.8 –1.6 –0.1 0.3 –0.3 –0.7
Eastern Sub-Saharan Africa –0.5 –1.1 –0.6 –1.8 –0.1 0.3 –0.2 –0.6
Nigeria –1.3 –2.9 0.0 –1.6 –0.0 0.4 –0.7 –2.0
All Sub-Saharan Africa –6.6 –16.1 –1.6 –5.2 –0.4 1.6 –3.8 –9.8
Egypt –6.9 –8.7 –2.9 –3.5 0.0 –0.8 0.3 –0.5
Other West Asia/North Africa –18.4   –31.2 –5.9 –11.4 –7.0 –18.8 –3.1 –5.7
All Africa –31.8 –55.9 –10.4 –20.1 –7.4 –18.0 –6.6 –16.0
Source: IFPRI IMPACT projections 2004.
Note: The total for “All Africa” is slightly higher than the actual total for all the individual countries because the IMPACT model
includes some West Asian countries in the “Other West Asia/North Africa” region (Cyprus, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon,
Saudi Arabia, Syria, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen).




18Africa of US$170.5 billion between 1997 and
2025 (Table 10). Rural roads account for projected
spending of US$61.4 billion, while education
accounts for US$38 billion, provision of access to
clean water for US$31.6 billion, irrigation
5 for
US$20.2 billion, and agricultural research for
US$19.4 billion. 
Pessimistic Scenario
Even with the relatively strong agricultural produc-
tivity growth projected under BAU, the food securi-
ty implications for Africa are disappointing.
Alternatively, Africa’s future could be even bleaker
with agricultural stagnation, drastically deepening
poverty, and worsening social indicators. Many
countries in the region have struggled with the tran-
sition to private sector input and output markets,
and uncertain input availability and producer prices
remain major factors limiting the ability of small-
holders to plan investments with long time horizons
(Byerlee and Eicher 1997). 
While BAU projects that area expansion will
slow over the next two decades, even these projec-
tions may be optimistic given the extent of the ongo-
ing degradation of the existing land base. Severe
soil fertility depletion and erosion affect both mar-
ginal and high-quality rainfed lands, frequently
characterized by inappropriate nutrient replace-
ment or conservationist practices, pest problems,
overdependence on maize monoculture, and high
water variability. A variety of studies indicate that
productivity losses from soil degradation since
World War II have amounted to 25 percent, with
African farm survey data showing declines in grain
yields from 2–4 metric tons per hectare to 1 metric
ton per hectare on originally fertile land, and esti-
mates of cumulative crop yield reductions from ero-
19
5 This irrigation investment calculation only includes the crop area for the commodities included in the IMPACT model.
Additional irrigated area planted with other crops is not included.












Northern Sub-Saharan Africa 1.0 4.3 1.9 5.4 0.9 13.5
Central and western Sub-
Saharan Africa 1.2 23.5 3.3 6.2 1.8 36.0
Southern Sub-Saharan Africa 6.6 13.4 6.3 3.4 2.7 32.4
Eastern Sub-Saharan Africa 0.4 7.2 2.7 3.6 3.8 17.7
Nigeria 8.0 6.2 3.9 3.9 1.0 23.0
All Sub-Saharan Africa 17.3 54.6 18.0 22.5 10.2 122.6
Egypt 0.0 0.5 2.2 1.7 3.4 7.9
Other West Asia/North Africa 2.9 6.3 17.7 7.5 5.7 40.1
All Africa 20.2 61.4 38.0 31.6 19.4 170.5
Source: IFPRI IMPACT projections 2004.
Note: The total for “All Africa” is slightly higher than the actual total for all the individual countries because the
IMPACT model includes some West Asian countries in the “Other West Asia/North Africa” region (Cyprus, Iran, Iraq,
Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen).
Total investments (billion US$)sion averaging 6.2 percent across all Sub-Saharan
African countries (Oldeman 1998 and Sanchez et
al. 1997 as cited in Scherr 1999; Scherr and
Yadav 1996). Bojo (1996) estimates economic loss
from soil degradation as ranging from under 1 per-
cent of agricultural GDP in Madagascar, Mali, and
South Africa to 2–5 percent of agricultural GDP in
Ethiopia and Ghana, to over 8 percent in
Zimbabwe (Scherr 1999). Soil degradation may
indeed remain a serious problem during the
IMPACT projection period, particularly on marginal
lands with rapidly growing populations in parts of
the Sahel, mountainous East Africa, and the dry belt
stretching from the coast of Angola to southern
Mozambique (Cleaver and Schreiber 1994). For
instance, Lal (1995) predicts that water erosion
alone will reduce crop productivity in Sub-Saharan
Africa by 14.5 percent between 1997 and 2020
(Scherr 1999). 
Given these worrisome trends and projections,
an alternative, pessimistic scenario may represent a
more plausible future for Africa. The pessimistic sce-
nario (henceforth PES) envisions a future in which
trends in agricultural production and nutrition dete-
riorate by comparison with BAU. African countries
experience a decline in investments, both national-
ly and from international donors. Education invest-
ments decline, and higher numbers of households
remain without access to clean water in 2025.
HIV/AIDS continues to affect a large proportion of
the population in many African countries because
of a continued lack of adequate investment in treat-
ment and prevention, especially from the interna-
tional community. This leads to a decline in labor
productivity, which is one of the factors that influ-
ences yield growth. Agricultural productivity
declines compared with BAU, while harvested area
growth increases at the same slow rate as in BAU.
This puts an increased burden on yield growth to
make up for the shortfall; however, yield growth
under PES declines compared with BAU. Soil fertili-
ty deterioration and increased erosion affect agri-
cultural land in many African countries, leading to
decreased yields. 
Within IMPACT, the PES scenario is quantified
by subtracting 0.50 percent from crop yield growth
rates and 0.50 percent from livestock growth (num-
ber of head) beginning in 2005 (see Table 11).
Additionally, because of the importance of agricul-
tural production to African economies, BAU GDP
growth rate assumptions are cut by 25 percent
under PES. Lastly, a variety of social indicators are
also projected to worsen, with female access to sec-
ondary schooling and access to clean water falling
by 15 percent and the female-to-male life expectancy
ratio falling by 1.5 percent compared with BAU lev-
els. Population growth is also expected to increase
in Africa under PES, so the UN medium variant pop-
ulation growth projections used for BAU are
replaced with the high variant for PES. 
20
Variable Pessimistic scenario Vision scenario
Crop yield growth 0.50 percent lower than BAU levels 50 percent higher than BAU levels
Livestock numbers growth 0.50 percent lower than BAU levels 50 percent higher than BAU levels 
Population High UN variant Low UN variant
GDP growth 25 percent lower than BAU levels 6.5 percent for Nigeria;
8 percent for the rest of Africa
Female access to secondary 
schooling 15 percent lower than BAU levels Reaches 90 percent
Clean water access 15 percent lower than BAU levels Reaches 95 percent
Female-to-male life 
expectancy ratio 1.5 percent lower than BAU levels 2 percent higher than BAU levels
Source: IFPRI IMPACT 2004.
Table 11—Assumptions for pessimistic and vision scenariosMalnutrition in Africa proliferates under PES.
Daily per capita kilocalorie availability in Sub-
Saharan Africa increases only slightly under this
scenario, from 2,231 kilocalories in 1997 to 2,333
kilocalories in 2025, cutting improvements made
under BAU by almost 300 kilocalories (Table 12).
The total number of malnourished children under
five years old in Sub-Saharan Africa escalates from
33 million to 55 million in 2025, 17 million more
children than projected under BAU (Table 13). As
with  BAU, northern Sub-Saharan Africa has the
largest number of malnourished children of all Sub-
Saharan regions under PES, with an increase from
10.2 million in 1997 to 19.6 million in 2025. With
21
Table 12—Projected per capita kilocalories available in Africa under the 
pessimistic scenario, 1997, 2015, 2020, and 2025
Region/Country
Baseline
1997 2015 2020 2025
Northern Sub-Saharan Africa 2,175 2,154 2,165 2,187
Central and western Sub-
Saharan Africa 2,175 2,220 2,261 2,308
Southern Sub-Saharan Africa 2,022 2,069 2,105 2,152
Eastern Sub-Saharan Africa 1,999 1,985 2,007 2,037
Nigeria 2,759 2,822 2,889 2,976
All Sub-Saharan Africa 2,231 2,257 2,290 2,333
West Asia/North Africaa 3,059 3,078 3,096 3,116
Source: IFPRI IMPACT projections 2004.
aIn this table, West Asia/North Africa includes Egypt, Other West Asia/North Africa, and Turkey.




1997 2015 2020 2025
Northern Sub-Saharan Africa 10.2  16.7 17.8 19.6
Central and western Sub-
Saharan Africa 6.9 10.0 10.2 11.0
Southern Sub-Saharan Africa 4.0 5.4 5.5 5.9
Eastern Sub-Saharan Africa 4.6 7.2 7.4 8.0
Nigeria 6.9 10.4 10.3 10.6
All Sub-Saharan Africa 32.7 49.7 51.2 55.1
West Asia/North Africaa 5.9 8.3 8.0 8.1
Table 13—Projected number of malnourished children in Africa under the 
pessimistic scenario, 1997, 2015, 2020, and 2025
Source: IFPRI IMPACT projections 2004.
aIn this table, West Asia/North Africa includes Egypt, Other West Asia/North Africa, and Turkey.
Number of malnourished children 
under five years old (millions)
Projectedincreases in malnourished children of between 3
and 4 million each, Nigeria, central and western
Sub-Saharan Africa, and eastern Sub-Saharan
Africa experience lower levels of growth in the num-
ber of malnourished children than other subregions
under this scenario. Southern Sub-Saharan Africa is
projected to have the lowest increase in malnour-
ishment, from 4 million malnourished children in
1997 to 5.9 million in 2025. The number of mal-
nourished children also increases in West
Asia/North Africa under PES, from 5.9 million chil-
dren in 1997 to 8.1 million children in 2025.
Malnourished children in Sub-Saharan Africa
also increase in percentage terms under the PES
scenario, from 32.8 percent in 1997 to 33.2 per-
cent in 2025 (Table 14). The percentage of mal-
nourished children declines slightly in Nigeria, cen-
tral and western Sub-Saharan Africa, and southern
Sub-Saharan Africa, but increases in northern Sub-
Saharan Africa by 0.3 percent and in eastern Sub-
Saharan Africa by 1.4 percent. While the percent-
age of malnourished children in West Asia/North
Africa does shift slightly over the projection period,
the 2025 percentage increase remains unchanged
from the 1997 level, at 13.2 percent. It is important
to note that the number of malnourished children in
the region could increase still further if African coun-
tries were unable to increase food imports to the
high levels needed under this scenario because of
budgetary and foreign exchange constraints.
One of the factors influencing the decline in
food security under PES is poor agricultural per-
formance compared with BAU. Conditions under
PES adversely affect overall agricultural production,
reducing cereal output in 2025 to 212 million met-
ric tons—9 percent below the BAU level—as cereal
production growth declines to 1.9 percent annually
(Table 15). Root and tuber production only reaches
294 million metric tons under PES, 7.5 percent
below the BAU level. Slowing area and yield
growth also contributes to the shortfall in agricultur-
al production, although both cereal and root and
tuber area growth remain slightly positive in Africa
at 0.9 percent annually (Table 16). These rates of
area growth represent declines from the actual 1.2
percent annual cereal area growth and 2.2 percent
annual root and tuber area growth achieved during
1967–2000, and reflect rising land scarcity and
degradation under PES. Cereal yield growth falls to
1.3 percent annually in Sub-Saharan Africa under
PES (Table 17). Cereal yield growth in North Africa
falls slightly over the projection period under this
Region/Country
Baseline
1997 2015 2020 2025
Northern Sub-Saharan Africa 40.0  40.5 39.6 40.3
Central and western Sub-
Saharan Africa 27.8 28.1 27.1 27.5
Southern Sub-Saharan Africa 26.9 27.0 25.9 26.4
Eastern Sub-Saharan Africa 27.6 29.0 28.1 29.0
Nigeria 39.1 39.4 38.3 38.6
All Sub-Saharan Africa 32.8 33.5 32.6 33.2
West Asia/North Africaa 13.2 13.4 12.8 13.2
Table 14—Projected percentage of malnourished children in Africa under  
the pessimistic scenario, 1997, 2015, 2020, and 2025
Source: IFPRI IMPACT projections 2004.
aIn this table, West Asia/North Africa includes Egypt, Other West Asia/North Africa, and Turkey.
% of malnourished children 
under five years old
Projected




course grains Rice All Cereals
All roots
and tubers
Northern Sub-Saharan Africa 2.3 –4.1 2.4 2.5 2.5 2.4
Central and western Sub-
Saharan Africa 2.7 0.4 3.1 3.0 2.6 2.6
Southern Sub-Saharan Africa 2.4 –2.2 3.1 2.4 3.2 2.1
Eastern Sub-Saharan Africa 3.4 –5.7 2.7 2.2 2.6 2.6
Nigeria 3.0 –0.8 2.3 2.5 2.7 2.4
All Sub-Saharan Africa 2.5 –1.9 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.5
Egypt 1.3 –0.8 0.4 1.2 1.5 2.0
Other West Asia/North Africa 1.6 –2.1 0.9 1.3 1.7 1.9
All Africa 1.6 –1.3 2.1 2.1 2.3 2.4
Source: IFPRI IMPACT projections 2004.
Note: The total for “All Africa” is slightly higher than the actual total for all the individual countries because the IMPACT model
includes some West Asian countries in the “Other West Asia/North Africa” region (Cyprus, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait,
Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen).
Crop production growth rates (% per year)
Table 16—Projected growth rates in cereal, root, and tuber area in Africa 
under the pessimistic scenario, 1997-2025
Region/Country All cereals All roots and tubers
Northern Sub-Saharan Africa 1.0 0.7
Central and western Sub-
Saharan Africa
1.2 1.2
Southern Sub-Saharan Africa 1.1 0.7
Eastern Sub-Saharan Africa 1.1 0.9
Nigeria 0.9 0.7
All Sub-Saharan Africa 1.0 0.9
Egypt 0.5 0.5
Other West Asia/North Africa 0.5 0.3
All Africa 0.9 0.9
Source: IFPRI IMPACT projections 2004.
Note: The total for “All Africa” is slightly higher than the actual total for all the individual countries
because the IMPACT model includes some West Asian countries in the “Other West Asia/North
Africa” region (Cyprus, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, United Arab
Emirates, and Yemen).
Cereal and roots and tubers area growth
(% per year)
2324




course grains Rice All Cereals
Northern Sub-Saharan Africa 1.0 1.0 1.4 1.6 1.3
Central and western Sub-
Saharan Africa
1.0 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.6
Southern Sub-Saharan Africa 0.1 1.0 1.8 1.4 1.1
Eastern Sub-Saharan Africa 1.5 1.1 1.3 1.6 1.2
Nigeria 1.5 1.1 1.3 1.6 1.3
All Sub-Saharan Africa 1.1 1.1 1.4 1.6 1.3
Egypt 0.5 0.8 0.7 0.9 0.7
Other West Asia/North Africa 1.1 0.8 0.4 1.2 0.9
Source: IFPRI IMPACT projections 2004.
Cereal yield growth (% per year)


















Northern Sub-Saharan Africa –1.7 –4.5 –0.1 –1.2  –0.1 –3.0 –0.4 –1.2
Central and western Sub-
Saharan Africa –1.9 -–4.3 –0.2 –4.7 –0.2 0.2 –2.3 –4.7
Southern Sub-Saharan Africa –1.2 –2.1 –0.8 –0.7 –0.1 0.2 –0.3 –0.7
Eastern Sub-Saharan Africa –0.5 –1.0 –0.6 –0.7 –0.1 0.0  –0.2 –0.7
Nigeria –1.3 –2.8 0.0 –2.1 0.0 –2.0  –0.7 –2.1
All Sub-Saharan Africa –6.6 –14.7 –1.6 –9.4 –0.4 –4.6 –3.8 –9.4
Egypt –6.9 –12.0 –2.9 –1.3 0.0 –0.9 0.3 –1.3
Other West Asia/North Africa –18.4   –41.1 –5.9 –6.5 –7.0 –19.6 –3.1 –6.5
All Africa –31.8 –67.9 –10.4 –17.2 –7.4 –25.1 –6.6 –17.2
Source: IFPRI IMPACT projections 2004.
Note: The total for “All Africa” is slightly higher than the actual total for all the individual countries because the
IMPACT model includes some West Asian countries in the “Other West Asia/North Africa” region (Cyprus, Iran, Iraq,
Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen).
Net cereal trade (million metric tons)
Wheat Maize
Other
coarse grains Ricescenario, with an annual growth rate of 0.7 percent
in Egypt and 0.9 percent in Other WANA. This
decline in food production, which increased
imports cannot offset, contributes to the increased
malnutrition across the region, and the reduction in
the already slow income growth that occurs in
African countries leads to inadequate levels of food
for many households. In terms of trade, Africa’s net
cereal imports of 110 million metric tons in 2025
under BAU increase to 127.4 million metric tons
under PES, reaching a level that may not be sus-
tainable over an extended period given foreign
exchange constraints (Table 18).
With its present day levels of food insecurity
and heavy dependence on food aid, Africa can ill
afford further declines in per capita income. The
continent simply does not possess the necessary for-
eign exchange to satisfy its food needs through
imports. While the assumptions underlying PES do
include a substantial increase in net imports of agri-
cultural commodities (especially cereals) to help mit-
igate the projected production gap, the region
would still experience a significant increase in child
malnourishment even at these high and potentially
economically unsustainable import levels. 
Investment expenditures fall sharply in Africa
under PES, declining 33 percent to US$114.9 bil-
lion (Table 19). Rural road investment in Africa
declines 31 percent from BAU levels to US$42.6 bil-
lion, education investment declines 17 percent to
US$31.7 billion, investment in clean water provision
declines 19 percent to US$25.7 billion, agricultural
research investment declines 23 percent to US$14.9
billion, and irrigation investment is discontinued.
Investment expenditures decline in all regions under
PES, with investments in Sub-Saharan Africa
decreasing 35 percent compared with BAU levels,
and investments in Other WANA decreasing by 29
percent. Egypt’s investments only decrease 10 per-
cent, however, as a result of a greater initial level of
development. Several regions in Sub-Saharan Africa
fare particularly badly, with Nigerian investments
declining by 47 percent and investments in southern
Sub-Saharan Africa declining by 40 percent.
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Northern Sub-Saharan Africa 0 2.9 1.7 4.7 0.7 10.0
Central and western Sub-
Saharan Africa 0 15.5 3.1 4.4 1.3 24.2
Southern Sub-Saharan Africa 0 9.2 5.8 2.3 2.2 19.5
Eastern Sub-Saharan Africa 0 4.9 2.5 3.1 2.9 13.4
Nigeria 0 4.3 3.6 3.5 0.8 12.3
All Sub-Saharan Africa 0 36.8 16.8 17.8 7.8 79.2
Egypt 0 0.4 2.3 1.6 2.8 7.1
Other West Asia/North Africa 0 5.4 12.7 6.3 4.3 28.6
All Africa 0 42.6 31.7 25.7 14.9 114.9
Source: IFPRI IMPACT projections 2004.
Note: The total for “All Africa” is slightly higher than the actual total for all the individual countries because the
IMPACT model includes some West Asian countries in the “Other West Asia/North Africa” region (Cyprus, Iran, Iraq,
Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen).
Total investments (billion US$)Budget constraints and declining international
interest in agriculture result in further declines in
public investment in crop breeding for rainfed agri-
culture in African countries, especially for staple
crops such as wheat, maize, rice, other coarse
grains, potatoes, cassava, yams, and sweet pota-
toes. The investment gap for these commodities is
not filled by private agricultural research, however,
because such research focuses mainly on devel-
oped-country commodities and commercial crops in
developing countries. Declining funding for research
leads to diminishing productivity growth in rainfed
crop areas, especially in marginal areas.
Vision Scenario 
The previous analysis prompts the question, “What
type of transformation, in terms of economic and
agricultural growth, education, and health, would
be necessary for Africa to battle childhood malnu-
trition as effectively as the rest of the developing
world?” The third scenario in our analysis, the
vision scenario (henceforth VIS), attempts to
answer this question by providing a sense of the
magnitude of the region’s challenges and the
necessity of concerted attention by national gov-
ernments and international organizations. VIS
models the interventions necessary to cut child mal-
nutrition in Africa sufficiently to reach the MDG tar-
get of cutting the proportion of people suffering
from hunger in half by 2015. It provides a glimpse
into a positive vision of substantial improvements in
African agriculture, nutrition, and food security.
National governments and international donors
increase investments in African countries to help
overcome many of the existing challenges facing
agriculture today. Labor productivity increases
through greater investments in education and
investments in HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment.
Improvements are also seen in productivity in rain-
fed areas, emphasizing water-harvesting technolo-
gies and extension assistance to farmers as means
of implementing these technologies. 
A dramatic decrease in childhood malnutrition
would be achieved if total GDP growth in Egypt,
Other WANA, and the five Sub-Saharan Africa sub-
regions (Nigeria, northern, central and western,
eastern, and southern) increased from BAU levels of
3.2–4.0 percent per year over the projection peri-
od to an annual growth rate of 6.5 percent for
Nigeria and 8 percent for all other African regions.
Population growth is also assumed to grow at a
lower rate under VIS, using the UN low variant pop-
ulation growth for the African region. Crop produc-
tivity, as expressed by annual yield growth, is
assumed to increase 50 percent over the BAU lev-
els for cereals, roots and tubers, and soybeans so
as to achieve the results projected under VIS.
Substantial crop yield growth at this level would
require an estimated 8 to 10 percent annual growth
in fertilizer use across the region, a level commen-
surate with the 9 percent annual growth achieved
in Asia between 1959/60 and 1994/95 (Bumb
and Baanante 1996).
6 Yield growth rates of this
level would be necessary to satisfy rising cereal
demand across the continent without increasing the
level of cereal imports. If yield growth rates were
lower, higher cereal imports could meet the deficit
between regional demand and supply, although it
is difficult to see how the region could achieve 8
percent GDP growth without tremendous growth in
agricultural productivity (see Table 11). 
A variety of additional variables concerning
access to clean water and the status and educa-
tion of women have proven crucial determinants
of childhood well-being and would have to
improve drastically to significantly improve malnu-
trition figures (Smith and Haddad 2000). Under
VIS, the rate of female access to secondary school-
ing is assumed to reach 90 percent, clean water
access is expected to reach 95 percent, and the
female-to-male life expectancy ratio is expected to
increase by 2 percent across the region by 2025.
Achievement of the impressive advances in quality-
of-life indicators represented by VIS would require
a tremendous level of commitment and investment
at all levels, and a major effort to focus on the sta-
tus, education, and health of women. 
Under this scenario, available kilocalories per
capita increase in Sub-Saharan Africa from 2,231
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6 Cleaver and Schreiber (1994), however, estimate that fertilizer use would have to rise 15 percent annually to achieve 3.5
percent annual yield growth. per day in 1997 to 3,455 per day in 2025 (Table
20). The number of malnourished children under
five years old in Sub-Saharan Africa decreases
substantially by 2025, with most regions falling
below 2 million children (Table 21). The total num-
ber of malnourished children in Sub-Saharan
Africa is reduced from 32.7 million in 1997 to
9.4 million in 2025. Northern Sub-Saharan Africa
is home to the largest number of malnourished
children, although great strides are made in this
region as well, with a reduction from 10.2 million
children in 1997 to 3.9 million in 2025. Childhood
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Table 20—Projected per capita kilocalories available in Africa under the 
vision scenario, 1997, 2015, 2020, and 2025
Region/Country
Baseline
1997 2015 2020 2025
Northern Sub-Saharan Africa 2,175 2,714 2,907 3,123
Central and western Sub-
Saharan Africa 2,175 2,849 3,091 3,351
Southern Sub-Saharan Africa 2,022 2,979 3,334 3,734
Eastern Sub-Saharan Africa 1,999 2,636 2,859 3,096
Nigeria 2,759 3,544 3,860 4,221
All Sub-Saharan Africa 2,231 2,926 3,178 3,455
West Asia/North Africaa 3,059 3,500 3,622 3,739
Source: IFPRI IMPACT projections 2004.
aIn this table, West Asia/North Africa includes Egypt, Other West Asia/North Africa, and Turkey.




1997 2015 2020 2025
Northern Sub-Saharan Africa 10.2  7.2 5.7 3.9
Central and western Sub-
Saharan Africa 6.9 3.8 2.9 1.7
Southern Sub-Saharan Africa 4.0 2.0 1.4 0.7
Eastern Sub-Saharan Africa 4.6 2.7 2.0 1.2
Nigeria 6.9 4.3 3.1 1.8
All Sub-Saharan Africa 32.7 20.0 15.1 9.4
West Asia/North Africaa 5.9 1.7 0.5 0.0
Table 21—Projected number of malnourished children in Africa under the 
vision scenario, 1997, 2015, 2020, and 2025
Source: IFPRI IMPACT projections 2004.
aIn this table, West Asia/North Africa includes Egypt, Other West Asia/North Africa, and Turkey.
Number of malnourished children 
under five years old (millions)
Projectedmalnourishment is completely eliminated in West
Asia/North Africa under PES, declining from 5.9
million in 1997.
Most notably, the percentage of malnourished
children under five years old meets—or comes
very close to meeting—the proposed MDG target
of cutting the percentage of malnourished children
in half by 2015 in all African regions (Table 22).
The percentage of malnourished children in all of
Sub-Saharan Africa declines by 25 percent over
the projection period, falling to 7.5 percent in
2025. The regions with the largest percentage of
malnourished children remaining in 2025 under
VIS are northern Sub-Saharan Africa and Nigeria,
with 10.3 and 9.3 percent, respectively. These
two regions still experience the largest decline in
the percentage of malnourished children, howev-
er, with a drop of around 30 percent.
A substantial increase in crop production is
required to reach the malnutrition goals for Africa
conceived under VIS. Annual cereal production
growth rates are projected to be 3 percent per
year for all of Africa, and 3.5 percent per year in
Sub-Saharan Africa alone between 1997 and
2025 under VIS (Table 23). Cereal production
growth in Egypt is the lowest of all regions, at 2.1
percent, while the highest growth is projected in
central and western Africa at 4.2 percent. Rice
yields are projected to have the largest percent-
age growth over the period, with a 3.4 percent
annual growth in Africa and a 4 percent growth
rate in Sub-Saharan Africa alone.
While both area and yield increases con-
tribute to the increase in production, yield growth
rates are higher over the time frame. Harvested
area of cereals, roots, and tubers for Africa as a
whole expands from 121 to 153 million hectares,
a gain of 32 million hectares over the projection
period. Although this is a significant total increase,
the annual area growth is only 0.8 percent per
year (Table 24). Yield growth increases substan-
tially under VIS. Growth between 1997 and 2025
across Sub-Saharan Africa is 2.5 percent for all
cereals, compared with the BAU level of 1.7 per-
cent. Root and tuber yields increase at an even
greater rate over the period, at 2.7 percent in Sub-
Saharan Africa, 3.0 percent in northern Sub-
Saharan Africa, and 2.9 percent in Other WANA
(Table 25).
Projected net cereal imports, at 101 million
metric tons by 2025, are significantly lower under




1997 2015 2020 2025
Northern Sub-Saharan Africa 40.0  21.2 15.8 10.3
Central and western Sub-
Saharan Africa 27.8 13.9 9.9 5.9
Southern Sub-Saharan Africa 26.9 12.4 8.2 4.0
Eastern Sub-Saharan Africa 27.6 13.8 9.9 6.0
Nigeria 39.1 20.5 14.9 9.3
All Sub-Saharan Africa 32.8 16.9 12.2 7.5
West Asia/North Africaa 13.2 3.8 1.2 0.0
Table 22—Projected percentage of malnourished children in Africa under 
the vision scenario, 1997, 2015, 2020, and 2025
Source: IFPRI IMPACT projections 2004.
aIn this table, West Asia/North Africa includes Egypt, Other West Asia/North Africa, and Turkey.
% of malnourished children 
under five years old
Projected29




course grains Rice All Cereals
Northern Sub-Saharan Africa 3.3 2.8 3.6 3.9 3.5
Central and western Sub-
Saharan Africa 3.8 3.9 4.4 4.5 4.2
Southern Sub-Saharan Africa 3.0 3.1 4.4 3.7 3.4
Eastern Sub-Saharan Africa 4.7 3.2 3.8 3.7 3.5
Nigeria 4.3 2.9 3.4 3.9 3.3
All Sub-Saharan Africa 3.6 3.2 3.7 4.0 3.5
Egypt 2.0 2.2 1.2 2.3 2.1
Other West Asia/North Africa 2.6 2.6 2.5 2.5 2.4
All Africa 2.6 3.0 3.2 2.6 3.0
Source: IFPRI IMPACT projections 2004.
Note: The total for “All Africa” is slightly higher than the actual total for all the individual countries because the
IMPACT model includes some West Asian countries in the “Other West Asia/North Africa” region (Cyprus, Iran, Iraq,
Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen).
Cereal production growth (% per year)
Source: IFPRI IMPACT projections 2004.
Note: The total for “All Africa” is slightly higher than the actual total for all the individual countries because the
IMPACT model includes some West Asian countries in the “Other West Asia/North Africa” region (Cyprus, Iran,





Northern Sub-Saharan Africa 30.0 38.9
Central and western Sub-
Saharan Africa 16.1 22.5
Southern Sub-Saharan Africa 11.4 15.1
Eastern Sub-Saharan Africa 9.4 12.5
Nigeria 23.9 30.0
All Sub-Saharan Africa 90.9 119.1
Egypt 2.8 3.2
Other West Asia/North Africa 27.1 30.5
All Africa 120.8 152.8
Table 24—Sum of 1997 harvested cereal, root, and tuber area in Africa and project-
ed 2025 cereal, root, and tuber area in Africa under the vision scenarioan increase of 80 percent over 1997 net import
levels. In percentage terms, the greatest increase
occurs in Sub-Saharan Africa, where total cereal
imports increase from 12 million metric tons in
1997 to 45 million in 2025 under VIS. The
increase in imports is very low in North Africa, at
only 1 percent in Egypt and 36 percent in Other
WANA. Of the four cereals, wheat imports are the
largest, reaching 52 million metric tons Africa-
wide by 2025 (Table 26).
The obstacles to achieving the results modeled
under VIS are daunting. This scenario requires a
78 percent increase in projected investments for
Africa over BAU levels for a total of US$303.2 bil-
lion (Table 27). The total percentage increase in
investments is even higher for Sub-Saharan Africa
alone, at 94 percent more than BAU levels from
1997 to 2025. Under VIS, rural road investment
rises 56 percent above BAU levels to US$95.4 bil-
lion, education investment jumps 117 percent to
US$82.3 billion, clean water investment increases
55 percent to US$49.1 billion, irrigation invest-
ment jumps 141 percent to US$48.7 billion, and
agricultural research investment increases 44 per-
cent to US$27.8 billion.
Greater investment in agricultural research
helps to improve crop yields. Investments in both
conventional breeding and in the tools of biotech-
nology, such as marker-assisted selection and cell
and tissue culture techniques, ultimately lead to
improved cereal yield growth in rainfed environ-
ments. This growth comes both from incremental
increases in the yield potential and from improved
stress resistance, including improved drought tol-
erance. Participatory plant breeding assists in tai-
loring new crop varieties for rainfed environments
and remote areas to lead to additional yield
increases. Better policies and increased rural infra-
structure investment help to exploit remaining yield
gaps by linking rural farmers to markets and
reducing the risks of rainfed farming.
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Table 25—Projected crop yield growth in Africa under the vision scenario, 1997–2025
Region/Country Wheat Maize
Other
course grains Rice All Cereals
All roots
and tubers
Northern Sub-Saharan Africa 2.0 2.0 2.7 2.9 2.5 3.0
Central and western Sub-
Saharan Africa 2.1 2.8 3.0 3.2 2.9 2.5
Southern Sub-Saharan Africa 0.7 2.0 3.2 2.7 2.2 2.5
Eastern Sub-Saharan Africa 2.8 2.2 2.5 3.0 2.4 2.8
Nigeria 2.8 2.2 2.5 2.9 2.4 2.9
All Sub-Saharan Africa 2.1 2.3 2.6 2.9 2.5 2.7
Egypt 1.2 1.7 1.6 1.9 1.6 2.8
Other West Asia/North Africa 2.2 1.7 1.1 2.3 1.9 2.9
All Africa 2.1 2.1 2.3 2.5 2.2 2.7
Source: IFPRI IMPACT projections 2004.
Note: The total for “All Africa” is slightly higher than the actual total for all the individual countries because the IMPACT
model includes some West Asian countries in the “Other West Asia/North Africa” region (Cyprus, Iran, Iraq, Jordan,
Kuwait, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen).
Crop yield growth (% per year)31


















Northern Sub-Saharan Africa –1.7 –9.7 –0.1 –0.1 –0.1 4.3 –0.4 –2.2
Central and western Sub-
Saharan Africa –1.9 -–7.4 –0.2 –6.2 –0.2 1.0 –2.3 –6.2
Southern Sub-Saharan Africa –1.2 –4.2 –0.8 –0.8 –0.1 0.6 –0.3 –0.8
Eastern Sub-Saharan Africa –0.5 –2.2 –0.6 –1.2 –0.1 0.4 –0.2 –1.2
Nigeria –1.3 –3.7 0.0 –2.8 –0.0 2.7 –0.7 –2.8
All Sub-Saharan Africa –6.6 –27.2 –1.6 –13.3 –0.4 9.0 –3.8 –13.3
Egypt –6.9 –7.3 –2.9 –0.7 0.0 –0.9 0.3 –0.7
Other West Asia/North Africa –18.4   –17.5 –5.9 –5.5 –7.0 –18.4 –3.1 –5.5
All Africa –31.8 –52.0 –10.4 –19.4 –7.4 –10.3 –6.6 –19.4
Source: IFPRI IMPACT projections 2004.
Note: The total for “All Africa” is slightly higher than the actual total for all the individual countries because the IMPACT model
includes some West Asian countries in the “Other West Asia/North Africa” region (Cyprus, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon,
Saudi Arabia, Syria, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen).















Northern Sub-Saharan Africa 3.4 6.8 17.4 12.1 1.3 40.9
Central and western Sub-
Saharan Africa 2.0 37.6 9.6 8.7 2.8 60.7
Southern Sub-Saharan Africa 12.5 20.9 9.5 4.6 4.0 51.4
Eastern Sub-Saharan Africa 1.0 11.5 10.2 6.5 5.5 34.7
Nigeria 19.8 9.6 12.8 7.0 1.5 50.7
All Sub-Saharan Africa 38.6 86.4 59.5 38.5 15.0 238.1
Egypt 0.6 0.7 2.6 2.1 4.7 10.6
Other West Asia/North Africa 9.4 8.3 20.2 8.4 8.1 54.5
All Africa 48.7 95.4 82.3 49.1 27.8 303.2
Source: IFPRI IMPACT projections 2004.
Note: The total for “All Africa” is slightly higher than the actual total for all the individual countries because the IMPACT model
includes some West Asian countries in the “Other West Asia/North Africa” region (Cyprus, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon,
Saudi Arabia, Syria, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen).
Total investments (billion US$)Under business as usual, parts of Africa are likely
to experience very high water stress. Three water-
related scenarios show that there are steps that pol-
icymakers and farmers can take to promote the
more effective use of water, with consequent bene-
fits for food production and food prices. 
Water Resources under the
Business as Usual Scenario 
Sub-Saharan Africa will experience the highest per-
centage growth in water consumption of all the
IMPACT regions over the period 1995–2025.
Under BAU, total water withdrawals for the region
as a whole are projected to increase from 128 km
3
in 1995 to 214 km
3 in 2025, a 67 percent
increase (Table 28). The greatest increases in
water withdrawals occur in central and western
Sub-Saharan Africa, at 125 percent, and Nigeria,
at 113 percent. Northern Sub-Saharan Africa has
a lower increase than the rest of the region under
BAU, at 31 percent. Water withdrawals in Egypt
and Other WANA also grow at a slower rate than
in Sub-Saharan Africa, at 21 and 20 percent,
respectively.
The “criticality ratio,” or ratio of water with-
drawal to total renewable water (TRW), is an indi-
cator of water scarcity at the basin level. A higher
criticality ratio indicates a more intensive use of
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3.  Scenarios for Water Resources
Table 28—Projected water withdrawal and the share of total renewable 












Northern Sub-Saharan Africa 52.2 68.3 31 0.06 0.08
Central and western Sub-
Saharan Africa 11.0 24.7 125 0.00 0.01
Southern Sub-Saharan Africa 44.4 78.3 76 0.04 0.07
Eastern Sub-Saharan Africa 9.9 19.6 98 0.03 0.06
Nigeria 10.9 23.2 113 0.04 0.08
All Sub-Saharan Africa 128.4 214.1 67 0.02 0.04
Egypt 54.3 65.6 21 0.89 1.08
Other West Asia/North Africa 143.2 171.5 20 1.16 1.39
All Africa 325.9      451.2 38 – –
Source: Rosegrant, Cai, and Cline 2002.
Note: The total for “All Africa” is slightly higher than the actual total for all the individual countries because the IMPACT-
WATER model includes some West Asian countries in the “Other West Asia/North Africa” region (Cyprus, Iran, Iraq,





river basin water, and lower water quality for
downstream users. Areas with criticality ratios
equal to or greater than 0.4 are considered to be
under “high water stress,” and those with ratios
equal to or greater than 0.8 are considered to be
under “very high water stress.” As shown by the
criticality ratios, Sub-Saharan Africa is not purely
water scarce. In Sub-Saharan Africa the criticality
ratio was 0.02 in 1995 and is projected to
increase to 0.04 in 2025 under BAU. The situation
is similar throughout all regions in Sub-Saharan
Africa, with the highest ratios in the region reach-
ing only 0.08 in Nigeria and northern Sub-
Saharan Africa (Table 28). North Africa’s level of
water stress is quite different, however. These areas
are considered to be under very high water stress,
with criticality ratios of 0.89 in Egypt and 1.16 in
Other WANA in 1995. The situation is projected
to worsen by 2025 under BAU, with both regions
expected to have a criticality ratio greater than 1
by 2025.
In 1995, irrigation accounted for 88 percent
of consumptive water use in Africa (Table 29). This
proportion varies significantly across the continent,
however, with irrigation accounting for at least 90
percent in North Africa and northern Sub-Saharan
Africa but only for around 50–60 percent in
Nigeria, central and western Sub-Saharan Africa,
and eastern Sub-Saharan Africa. While this ratio
declines in all regions under BAU, the greatest
decline in the share of water consumed for irriga-
tion occurs in eastern Sub-Saharan Africa, from 57
percent in 1995 to 38 percent in 2025 (Table 29).
Non-irrigation water use (primarily related to
household and industrial uses) increases consider-
ably by 2025, however, from 21 km
3 to over 47
km
3 in 2025 under BAU, leading to a decline in
the share of irrigation to 79 percent across Africa
(Table 30).
However, this appearance of plentiful water at
the basin level is misleading, largely because of
the lack of investment in water resources develop-
ment. In fact, developed water at the irrigation sys-
tem is scarce and becoming increasingly more so.
This scarcity can be observed through the irrigation
water supply reliability index (IWSR). The IWSR is















Northern Sub-Saharan Africa 3.08 37.5 27.7 29.7 0.90 0.79
Central and western Sub-
Saharan Africa 5.4 11.3 2.6 3.6 0.48 0.32
Southern Sub-Saharan Africa 16.0 24.2 14.0 19.6 0.88 0.81
Eastern Sub-Saharan Africa 4.6 8.5 2.6 3.2 0.57 0.38
Nigeria 5.6 11.8 3.5 6.7 0.63 0.57
All Sub-Saharan Africa 62.4 93.3 50.4 62.8 0.81 0.67
Egypt 27.9 31.9 25.4 27.2 0.91 0.85
Other West Asia/North Africa 84.4 95.9 78.1 84.2 0.93 0.88
All Africa 174.7 221.1 153.9 174.2 0.88 0.79
Source: Rosegrant, Cai, and Cline 2002.
Note: The total for “All Africa” is slightly higher than the actual total for all the individual countries because the
IMPACT-WATER model includes some West Asian countries in the “Other West Asia/North Africa” region (Cyprus, Iran,








Table 30—Projected non-irrigation water consumption in Africa under the business as 














Northern Sub-Saharan Africa 2.4 5.9 0.2 0.5 3.1 7.8
Central and western Sub-
Saharan Africa 2.4 6.4 0.2 0.6 2.8 7.7
Southern Sub-Saharan Africa 1.5 3.4 0.2 0.5 2.0 4.6
Eastern Sub-Saharan Africa 1.6 4.3 0.1 0.2 2.0 5.3
Nigeria 1.7 3.8 0.2 0.7 2.1 5.1
All Sub-Saharan Africa 9.6 23.8 0.9 2.5 12.0 30.5
Egypt 1.6 2.9 0.7 1.5 2.5 4.7
Other West Asia/North Africa 3.4 6.3 2.0 3.5 6.2 11.7
All Africa 14.6 33.0 3.6 7.5 20.7 46.9
Source: Rosegrant, Cai, and Cline 2002.
Note: The total for “All Africa” is slightly higher than the actual total for all the individual countries because the
IMPACT-WATER model includes some West Asian countries in the “Other West Asia/North Africa” region (Cyprus,
Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen).
Domestic (km3) Industry (km3)
Total
non-irrigation (km3)
Table 31—Projected irrigation and non-irrigation water supply reliability in 










Northern Sub-Saharan Africa 0.74 0.70 0.97 0.95
Central and western Sub-
Saharan Africa 0.96 0.88 1.00 1.00
Southern Sub-Saharan Africa 0.72 0.72 1.00 1.00
Eastern Sub-Saharan Africa 0.80 0.74 0.99 0.98
Nigeria 0.59 0.72 0.94 0.95
All Sub-Saharan Africa 0.73 0.72 0.98 0.97
Egypt 0.73 0.71 1.00 1.00
Other West Asia/North Africa 0.79 0.75 1.00 1.00




Reliability (NIWSR)the proportion of potential demand (the demand
for irrigation water in the absence of any water
supply constraints) realized in actual consumptive
use (the realized water demand, given the limita-
tions of water supply for irrigation) and is defined
as the ratio of water supply available for irrigation
to potential demand for irrigation water. Sub-
Saharan Africa had the lowest irrigation reliability
of any major region in 1995, at 0.73, indicating
that less than three-quarters of potential irrigation
demand in existing systems is being met (Table
31). Nigeria had an extremely low reliability in
1995, at 0.59, but under BAU, the index increas-
es to 0.72 in 2025. Northern Sub-Saharan
Africa’s index falls from 0.74 to 0.7 over the pro-
jection period; central and western Sub-Saharan
Africa experiences an even larger decline, from
0.96 to 0.88; and the index also falls in eastern
Sub-Saharan Africa, from 0.8 to 0.74. In southern
Sub-Saharan Africa an average of 0.72 is main-
tained, but with extreme decreases in reliability in
low rainfall years. IWSR values also decline in
North Africa—from 0.73 to 0.71 in Egypt, and
from 0.79 to 0.75 in Other WANA (Table 31).
Irrigated and Rainfed
Production
Irrigated area in Africa is small relative to the rest
of the world, at only 12.8 million hectares for
cereals in 1995, which under BAU increases to
15.4 million hectares in 2025 (Table 32 and
Appendix Table A.1). This is equal to 12.5 per-
cent of the total African cereal area in 1995 and
11.4 percent in 2025. Irrigated cereal area in
Sub-Saharan Africa is especially small, compris-
ing only 4.5 percent of the total cereal area in
1995 and 4.8 percent in 2025. A slightly larger
percentage of cereal area is irrigated in North
Africa, with 31.9 percent of total area irrigated in
1995 and 32.1 percent in 2025. 
While Sub-Saharan Africa and Africa as a
whole have a larger percentage of rainfed area
than many other regions around the world, North
Africa is more on par with the global average. In
1995, 69 percent of global cereal area planted
was rainfed, including 40 percent of rice, 66 per-
cent of wheat, 82 percent of maize, and 86 percent
of other grains. Worldwide rainfed cereal yield is
about 2.2 metric tons per hectare, which is about
65 percent of the irrigated yield. Rainfed cereal
production accounts for 58 percent of worldwide
cereal production, and irrigated production
accounts for 42 percent of world production. 
The proportion of cereals produced using irri-
gated agriculture is also relatively low in Africa,
although this differs considerably between North
Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa. Overall, 34 per-
cent of African cereal production was irrigated in
1995, with only 10.6 percent in Sub-Saharan
Africa and 62 percent in North Africa (Appendix
Table A.2). By 2025 under BAU, irrigation
accounts for 11.4 percent of total cereal produc-
tion in Sub-Saharan Africa, and 64 percent of
cereal production in North Africa. While irrigated
production is higher across North Africa, irriga-
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Table 32—Cereal area, production, and yield in all Africa under the business as usual
scenario, 1995 and 2025
Indicator Irrigated Rainfed Total Irrigated Rainfed Total
Cereal area (million hectares) 12.8 90.1 102.9 15.4 119.9 135.3
Cereal production (million metric tons) 40.8 79.8 120.6 67.0 150.8 217.8
Cereal yield (metric tons per hectare) 3.19 0.89 1.17 2.43 1.26 1.48
Source: Rosegrant, Cai, and Cline 2002.
Baseline 1995 Projected 2025tion is especially crucial to Egyptian agriculture
because nearly all cereal production is irrigated.
Cereal yields are also extremely low in Sub-
Saharan Africa. In 1995, the total cereal yield for
all of Sub-Saharan Africa area was only 0.91 met-
ric tons per hectare. Under BAU it is projected to
increase to 1.34 metric tons per hectare in 2025.
The irrigated cereal yield in Sub-Saharan Africa
was 2.16 metric tons per hectare, and under BAU
it is projected to increase to 3.23 metric tons per
hectare in 2025. Given the prevalence of irriga-
tion in Egypt, as already mentioned, Egyptian irri-
gated yields are much higher than in the rest of
Africa, at 5.48 in 1995, rising to 8.36 by 2025
under BAU (Appendix Table A.3). 
In 1995, 51 percent of all harvested root and
tuber area in Africa was irrigated. The proportion
was similar in both Sub-Saharan Africa (51 per-
cent), and North Africa (45 percent). The ratios in
Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa are expected to
decrease slightly by 2025, with 49 percent of har-
vested area irrigated in both regions (Table 33
and Appendix Table A.4). Irrigated root and tuber
area increases slightly in North Africa under BAU
over the projection period, with 51 percent of the
harvested area irrigated in 2025. In 1995, 55 per-
cent of all root and tuber production in Africa and
Sub-Saharan Africa and 58 percent of all root and
tuber production in North Africa was irrigated. The
2025 projected equivalents under BAU are 52
percent in Africa, 51 percent in Sub-Saharan
Africa, and 59 percent in North Africa (Appendix
Table A.5). 
In 1995, African root and tuber yield was 8.0
metric tons per hectare; it is projected to increase
to 12.4 metric tons per hectare by 2025 under
BAU. The regional average yields are slightly
higher for irrigated as opposed to rainfed areas.
North African yields are significantly higher than
in Sub-Saharan Africa in both 1995 and 2025,
primarily because of the high irrigated yields.
Root and tuber yields are projected to increase
from 21.3 metric tons per hectare in Egypt and
25.7 metric tons per hectare in the Other WANA
in 1995, to 28.2 metric tons per hectare and
47.2 metric tons per hectare, respectively, in
2025 (Appendix Table A.6). 
Water Harvesting
Rainfed agriculture will retain an important role in
the growth of food production in the future.
However, appropriate investments and policy
reforms will be required to enhance the contribu-
tion of rainfed agriculture. Water harvesting is one
technique that has the potential in some regions to
improve rainfed crop yields and provide farmers
with improved water availability and increased
soil fertility in some local and regional ecosystems,
as well as environmental benefits through reduced
soil erosion. Water harvesting involves concen-
trating and collecting the rainwater from a larger
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Table 33—Roots and tubers area, production, and yield in Africa under the business as 
usual scenario, 1995 and 2025
Indicator Irrigate Rainfed Total Irrigated Rainfed Totals
Roots and tubers area 
(million hectares) 8.8 8.5 17.3 10.7 11.2 21.8
Roots and tubers production 
(million metric tons) 75.4 62.2 137.7 139.5 130.0 269.5
Roots and tubers yield 
(metric tons per hectare) 8.6 7.3 8.0 13.1 11.6 12.4
Source: Rosegrant, Cai, and Cline 2002.
Baseline 1995 Projected 2025catchment area onto a smaller cultivated area. The
runoff can either be diverted directly and spread
on the fields, or collected in some way to be used
at a later time. 
While many water-harvesting case studies
and experiments have shown increases in yield
and water use efficiency, it is not clear if the wide-
spread use of these technologies is feasible.
Construction and maintenance costs for water-har-
vesting systems—particularly the labor costs—are
particularly important in determining if a tech-
nique will be widely adopted at the individual
farm level. The initial high labor costs of building
the water-harvesting structure often provide disin-
centives for adoption. The initial labor costs for
construction generally occur in the dry season
when labor is cheaper but scarce because of
worker migration; maintenance costs, on the other
hand, often occur in the rainy season when labor
costs are higher because of competition with con-
ventional agriculture. The impacts of HIV/AIDS on
agricultural labor in Africa would likely cause
additional problems in terms of sourcing adequate
labor to initiate water-harvesting projects, and
some projects may require inputs that are too
expensive for some farmers to supply. In addition,
many farmers in arid or semi-arid areas do not
have the capacity to move large amounts of
earth—a necessary aspect of some of the larger
water-harvesting systems. 
Given the high costs of implementation and
higher short-term risk from the necessity of addi-
tional inputs, cash, and labor, broader farmer
acceptance of water-harvesting techniques has
been limited, despite localized successes.
Moreover, water-harvesting initiatives frequently
suffer from lack of hydrological data, insufficient
attention to important social and economic con-
siderations during the planning stages, and the
absence of a long-term government strategy for
ensuring the sustainability of interventions.
Involving farmers more heavily in the planning
stages and using farmers to maintain and collect
data, as well as providing appropriate education-
al and extension support, could help expand the
contribution of water harvesting. 
Scenarios for High Increase in
Effective Rainfall Use
In addition to direct investment in blue water—
meaning water derived from increased withdrawal
capacity and efficient irrigation and municipal and
industrial use—an alternative approach would be
to invest in increasing the availability of green
water—that which is available for evapotranspira-
tion in rainfed areas. As a substitute to resolving
the water shortage problem, effective rainfall avail-
able for crop growth can be increased through
rainfall-harvesting technology. IMPACT simulates
three scenarios on the basis that improved water
harvesting results in effective rainfall use in rainfed
areas, which gradually increases over time as a
percentage of actual rainfall. Effective rainfall is
defined here as the rainfall infiltration that is avail-
able for crop evapotranspiration. 
Although improved water harvesting is often
considered in connection with traditional agricul-
ture, it also has potential in highly developed agri-
culture. Advanced tillage practices can also
increase the share of rainfall that goes to infiltration
and evapotranspiration. Contour plowing, which is
typically a soil-preserving technique, also acts to
capture, and allow infiltration of, a higher propor-
tion of the precipitation. Precision leveling can also
lead to greater relative infiltration and hence a
higher percentage of effective rainfall.
For the high increase in effective rainfall use sce-
nario (henceforth HIER), it is assumed that effective
rainfall increases evenly over the projection period
compared with BAU, and that by 2025, effective
rainfall use (in rainfed areas only) is 10 percent high-
er than base year levels in those basins/countries
where water shortages for crop growth exist. The
analysis considers three scenarios: 
1.HIER–1: BAU combined with HIER, where-
by effective 2025 rainfall use in all
basins/countries is 10 percent higher than
actual base-year rainfall; 
2.HIER–2: BAU and HIER combined with low
investments in irrigation; and 
3.HIER–3: BAU combined with a 15 percent
increase in effective rainfall use in 2025 in
Sub-Saharan African countries only. 
37Under HIER–1, global rainfed cereal produc-
tion is 1,492 million metric tons in 2021–25,
nearly 5 percent higher than the 1,424 million
metric tons under BAU. The total production effect
is somewhat less, however, because the boost in
rainfed production through higher effective rainfall
also tends to reduce cereal prices. Lower prices
then act to dampen the total production effect by
reducing production in irrigated areas. Hence the
overall outcome is that high rainfall harvesting
results in a combination of higher production with
lower cereal prices, which is an important
improvement. The price of wheat declines by 10
percent relative to BAU because of the production
benefits of high rainfall harvesting; price effects
are similar for rice and maize. 
Under  HIER–2, improved rainfall harvesting
partly compensates for lower irrigation investment
by cutting price increases resulting from the low
investments by about half. 
HIER–3 explores whether rainfall harvest
improvements can make a significant difference if
they occur on a limited regional basis only. The 15
percent increase in rainfall harvesting in Sub-
Saharan Africa alone causes the cereal import
burden to be cut by half, reducing average
imports from 17.4 million metric tons per year to
8.7 million metric tons per year in 2021–25.
Other Water-Related Measures
In addition to water harvesting, the use of improved
farming techniques has been suggested to help
conserve soil and make more effective use of rain-
fall. Conservation tillage measures such as mini-
mum-till and no-till farming have been tested in
some developing countries. Precision agriculture,
7
which has been used in the United States, has also
been suggested for use in developing countries.
Along with research on integrated nutrient man-
agement, applied research to adapt conservation
tillage technologies for use in unfavorable rainfed
systems in developing countries could have a
large, positive impact on local food security and
standards of living. 
Increased investment in rural infrastructure and
policies is also important to close the gap between
potential yields in rainfed areas and actual yields
achieved by farmers. Important policies include
higher priority for rainfed areas in agricultural
extension services, and access to markets, credit,
and input supplies. The successful development of
rainfed areas is likely to be more complex than in
high-potential irrigated areas because of the inher-
ent comparative lack of access to infrastructure and
markets and more difficult and variable agrocli-
matic environments. Progress may also be slower
than in the early Green Revolution because new
approaches will need to be developed and tested
on a small scale for the specific environments
involved before they can be disseminated more
widely. Investment in rainfed areas, policy reform,
and transfer of technology such as water harvest-
ing will therefore require stronger partnerships
between agricultural researchers and other agents
of change, including local organizations, farmers,
community leaders, nongovernmental organiza-
tions (NGOs), national policymakers, and donors. 
38
7 Precision agriculture methods focus on information technology using site-specific soil, crop, and other environmental data to
determine specific inputs required for certain sections of a field (Rosegrant, Cai, and Cline 2002).39
Producers and consumers of agricultural products
in Africa can benefit from changes that give farm-
ers better access to markets, both domestic and
international. Scenarios for reduced marketing
margins and increased trade liberalization show
potential increases in agricultural productivity as
well as broad economic benefits.
Reduction in Marketing
Margins
As the earlier discussion of projection results under
VIS showed, increases in crop productivity can
have significant effects on production levels.
Another method for increasing productivity is to
improve rural infrastructure, marketing, and com-
munications, thus decreasing marketing margins.
This could be especially important in developing
countries where rural infrastructure is lacking. A
reduction in high domestic marketing margins can
allow producers and consumers to gain from
increased productivity. In this scenario (henceforth
reduced marketing margins, or RMM), we esti-
mate the effects of a 50 percent reduction in the
marketing margins in Sub-Saharan Africa and a
40 percent reduction in North Africa. As with the
HIER scenarios, all other parameters are the same
as under BAU. 

























Northern Sub-Saharan Africa 22.7 48.3 51.2 20.5 42.3 46.0
Central and western Sub-
Saharan Africa 13.9 32.3 34.8 9.4 22.7 24.8
Southern Sub-Saharan Africa 12.3 24.6 26.7 9.8 20.0 22.5
Eastern Sub-Saharan Africa 10.8 21.9 23.6 9.0 18.7 20.8
Nigeria 22.8 47.6 51.2 20.6 41.4 45.1
All Sub-Saharan Africa 82.5 174.6 187.5 69.3 145.1 159.2
Egypt 23.7 37.8 39.2 15.9 24.3 26.0
Other West Asia/North Africa 73.5 129.7 135.1 38.9 62.7 65.6
All Africa 179.7   342.2 361.8 124.1 232.2 250.8
Table 34—Cereal demand and production in Africa under the business as usual and 
reduced marketing margins scenarios, 1997 and 2025
Source: IFPRI IMPACT projections 2004.
Note: The total for “All Africa” is slightly higher than the actual total for all the individual countries because the
IMPACT model includes some West Asian countries in the “Other West Asia/North Africa” region (Cyprus, Iran, Iraq,





Projected 2025 Projected 2025The decreased marketing margins cause an
increase in cereal production and demand in Africa.
In the region as a whole, cereal demand under
RMM increases 5.7 percent over BAU levels, while
cereal production increases 8.0 percent. The effect
is greater in the Sub-Saharan region alone, where
cereal demand increases 7.3 percent and cereal
production 9.7 percent over BAU levels (Table 34).
Cereal production and demand also increase in
Egypt, by 6.8 percent and 3.6 percent, respectively,
while production in Other WANA increases by 4.6
percent and demand by 4.2 percent.
The impact is even stronger for meat commodi-
ties, with an increase of 9.3 percent in African meat
demand and 9.8 percent in meat production. As in
the case of cereals, the effects on meat commodities
are even greater in Sub-Saharan Africa, where meat
demand increases by 12.6 percent and meat pro-
duction by 11.5 percent over BAU levels (Table 35).
North Africa also experiences an increase in meat
production and demand under RMM, with a 7.8
percent increase in production and a 5.7 percent
increase in demand over BAU levels.
These projected increases in production and
demand also have an effect on the number of mal-
nourished children in Africa. The proposed reduc-
tion in marketing margins under RMM reduces the
percentage of malnourished children in Sub-
Saharan Africa in 2025 to 25.2 percent com-
pared with the 28.2 percent projected under BAU.
Although the difference in percentage terms may
not seem exceptional, it translates as 4.1 million
fewer malnourished children under five years old

























Northern Sub-Saharan Africa 1.6 3.9 4.3 1.6 3.8 4.3
Central and western Sub-
Saharan Africa 1.0 2.5 2.8 0.8 2.3 2.5
Southern Sub-Saharan Africa 0.9 2.0 2.3 0.9 2.1 2.3
Eastern Sub-Saharan Africa 0.9 2.2 2.4 0.9 2.1 2.4
Nigeria 1.1 2.7 3.1 1.1 2.4 2.7
All Sub-Saharan Africa 5.5 13.3 15.0 5.4 12.7 14.1
Egypt 1.0 2.4 2.6 0.9 1.9 2.1
Other West Asia/North Africa 4.9 9.9 10.5 4.3 8.6 9.3
All Africa 11.4 25.6 28.0 10.6 23.2 25.5
Table 35—Projected meat demand and production in Africa under the business as usual
and reduced marketing margins scenarios, 1997 and 2025
Source: IFPRI IMPACT projections 2004.
Note: The total for “All Africa” is slightly higher than the actual total for all the individual countries because the
IMPACT model includes some West Asian countries in the “Other West Asia/North Africa” region (Cyprus, Iran, Iraq,





Projected 2025 Projected 202541
Asia/North Africa,
8 the percentage falls only
slightly, from 4.4 percent under BAU to 3.8 percent
under RMM (Table 36).
Trade Liberalization
Three scenarios were modeled using IMPACT to
assess the effects of different levels of trade liber-
alization on Africa: 
1.FTL: full trade liberalization, whereby pro-
ducer and consumer subsidy equivalent
prices (PSEs and CSEs, respectively) between
domestic and international prices (price
wedges) are completely removed in all coun-
tries, with the reductions beginning in 2005; 
2.Africa protectionism, or PRO: an increase of
0.50 in PSE and CSE values in all African
countries in 2005, and maintenance of those
levels from 2005 to 2025; and
3.Africa trade liberalization, or ATL: removal
of all price wedges for all African countries
(including all Sub-Saharan African regions,
Egypt, and Other WANA), while retaining
baseline protection levels in all other coun-
tries and regions.
Caution is still warranted when interpreting the
results projected under these scenarios because
IMPACT is a partial equilibrium model and thus
does not account for the cross-sectoral linkages that
would undoubtedly accompany widespread trade
liberalization. A general equilibrium model would
best assess these linkages (see, for example, Diao,
Roe, and Somwaru 2001). Nevertheless, the direc-
tion and relative magnitude of the changes that
result from the implementation of these scenarios
are instructive in assessing the importance of the
























Northern Sub-Saharan Africa 10.2 13.8 12.6 40.0 36.3 33.3
Central and western Sub-
Saharan Africa 6.9 8.3 7.3 27.8 23.2 20.4
Southern Sub-Saharan Africa 4.0 4.2 3.4 26.9 21.6 17.8
Eastern Sub-Saharan Africa 4.6 5.0 4.5 27.6 24.2 21.8
Nigeria 6.9 7.1 6.3 39.1 32.3 28.7
All Sub-Saharan Africa 32.7 38.3 34.2 32.8 28.2 25.2
West Asia/North Africaa 5.9 3.6 1.8 13.2 7.7 3.8
Table 36—Projected number and percentage of malnourished children in Africa under the
business as usual and reduced marketing margins scenarios, 1997 and 2025
Source: IFPRI IMPACT projections 2004.
aIn this table, West Asia/North Africa includes Egypt, Other West Asia/North Africa, and Turkey.
Number of malnourished children
under five years old (millions)
% of malnourished children 
under five years old
Projected 2025 Projected 2025
8 Here, West Asia/North Africa includes Egypt, Other WANA, and Turkey. Impacts on Commodity Prices
Under FTL, removing trade barriers in all countries
could have a significant effect on cereal prices in
2025, with increases projected in the range of
9–32 percent above projected BAU levels (Table
37). Of the cereal commodities, rice prices have
the largest projected increase, at 14 percent, fol-
lowed closely by maize, wheat, and other coarse
grains. However, meat, and especially milk,
prices escalate even more sharply in response to
FTL because meat and milk prices are more dis-
torted under BAU than are cereal prices. The
smallest increase in meat prices is 12 percent for
pork and poultry, while beef, sheep, and goat
meat rise by 19 percent. Milk prices increase at a
steep 32 percent under FTL. The removal of the
price distortions consequently has a greater
impact on livestock producers and consumers than
on cereal producers and consumers.
9
As is to be expected, world prices react more
strongly under FTL than they do under ATL. Under
ATL, cereal prices rise between 1 and 3 percent
above  BAU levels, while meat and milk prices
increase between 1 and 4 percent. The effects are
similar—though slightly higher—under PRO,
whereby meat and milk prices increase 2–3 per-
cent above BAU levels, and cereal prices increase
5–8 percent above BAU levels (Table 37).
Economic Benefits of Trade Liberalization
Although trade and prices are highly important
indicators for evaluating the results of the various
42
Table 37—Projected world prices under the business as usual and trade liberalization



















Beef 1,808 1,707 2,030 1,771 1,765
Pork 2,304 2,165 2,421 2,215 2,189
Poultry 735 712 799 730 720
Sheep and goats 2,918 2,732 3,245 2,816 2,832
Milk 318 278 366 287 281
Wheat 133 117 128 123 119
Rice 285 232 264 245 238
Maize 103 102 112 107 103
Other coarse grains 97 86 94 93 87
Source: IFPRI IMPACT projections 2004. 
World prices (US$ per metric ton)
9 It should be noted that the net effect on consumers of an increase in prices due to full trade liberalization depends on the level
of distortions they face under the current trading regime. Although international cereal and livestock prices increase under FTL,
consumers living under particularly heavily taxed systems will pay lower prices overall. trade liberalization scenarios, it is most important
to know what the net economic benefits would be.
In the partial equilibrium approach utilized here,
the net economic benefits due to full trade liberal-
ization are estimated as the net benefits to pro-
ducers (change in producer surplus) plus the net
benefits to consumers (change in consumer sur-
plus) plus the tax savings due to removals of sub-
sidies under trade liberalization compared with
the baseline results in 2025. It is projected that the
net benefits in Africa under FTL for IMPACT com-
modities included in the model would total
US$5.4 billion in 2025 (Table 38). The largest
gain occurs in Sub-Saharan Africa, at US$4.60
billion, and the smallest gain occurs in Other
WANA, at US$0.29 billion. Among the Sub-
Saharan countries in 2025, northern Sub-Saharan
Africa gains most under FTL, at US$2.22 billion,
while eastern Sub-Saharan Africa has the lowest
gain under FTL, at US$0.25 billion. The highest
benefits to Sub-Saharan Africa—85 percent of the
total benefits—are gained broadly through meat,
milk, and cereal commodities (Table 38). They
arise, in part, because African farmers face less
competition from subsidized exports from devel-
oped countries under FTL; further, the removal of
the costly subsidies and taxes that many African
governments impose on food production and con-
sumption is also a significant factor.
10
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Region/Country Projected benefits in 2025 (billion US$)
Northern Sub-Saharan Africa 2.22
Central and western Sub-Saharan Africa 0.72
Southern Sub-Saharan Africa 0.69
Eastern Sub-Saharan Africa 0.25
Nigeria 0.72
All Sub-Saharan Africa 4.60
Egypt 0.51
Other West Asia/North Africa 0.29
All Africa 5.40
Source: IFPRI IMPACT projections 2004. 
Note: The total for “All Africa” is slightly higher than the actual total for all the individual countries
because the IMPACT model includes some West Asian countries in the “Other West Asia /North Africa”
region (Cyprus, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, United Arab Emirates, and
Yemen). 
Table 38—Projected benefits in Africa of global trade liberalization for IMPACT 
commodities under the full trade liberalization scenario, 2025
10 The world price and global net benefits estimated here are similar in magnitude to those estimated by Diao, Roe, and
Somwaru (2001) using a general equilibrium model for full agricultural trade liberalization, including a few additional com-
modities such as sugar and fruits and vegetables. Diao, Roe, and Somwaru estimated static welfare net benefits of US$31.1
billion and an increase in the index of world agricultural prices of 11.6 percent. However, our results find a considerably larg-
er share of benefits accrue to developing countries, at 59 percent compared with the 8 percent reported by Diao, Roe, and
Somwaru.44
5.  CONCLUSIONS 
Many of the challenges facing Africa’s agricultural
sector, as discussed in this paper, stem from a few
root causes. One of the major factors leading to fail-
ures in the agricultural sector is poor political and
economic governance in many African countries
(including ineffective institutions). Inadequate fund-
ing for the agricultural sector, including the weak
role played by the private sector, has also hindered
agricultural development. Water resources man-
agement has been at issue in many African coun-
tries, with poor infrastructure and lack of attention
paid to climatic conditions, such as major droughts
(Cooper 2004). In addition, the neglect of research
and development and its funding has hindered the
growth of the agricultural sector (Badiane 2004).
The strategies for addressing these challenges
should take into account local, natural, and human
resources, as well as the political and economic
agenda of each country. However, the various sce-
narios assessed in this paper point to common poli-
cy priorities for addressing food and nutrition secu-
rity in Africa. The following priority areas are dis-
cussed below in greater detail: (1) reform of agri-
cultural policies, trade, and tariffs; (2) investment in
rural infrastructure, education, and social capital; (3)
crop, land, water, and input management; (4) agri-
cultural research and extension; and (5) investment
in women.
Reform of Agricultural Policies,
Trade, and Tariffs
Africa’s high export prices limit farmers’ access to
the international markets (Gladwin et al. 2001). In
addition, domestic subsidies, protective tariffs,
and other trade barriers imposed by wealthy
nations harm farmers in Africa and other poor
developing countries. The agricultural subsidies
provided to farmers in developed countries reduce
the likelihood of export opportunities for develop-
ing country farmers because consumers favor the
artificially cheaper products produced by devel-
oped countries. Subsidized imported products
also often displace the locally produced products
in developing countries. Additional considerations
need to be taken at the domestic level to take
advantage of reforms in trade policies. Reforms in
government bureaucracies and in the manage-
ment of airports, ports, and customs agencies must
be undertaken to experience the full benefits of
trade reforms.
Reforms in agricultural and trade policy in
North Africa started in the mid-1980s and sought
to liberalize output and input prices, increase pri-
vate sector involvement in agricultural production
and trade, and privatize state trading enterprises.
Some North African countries, such as Algeria,
Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia, sought to undertake
sweeping macroeconomic and sectoral reforms
affecting wages, interest and exchange rates, com-
modity prices, and domestic and international
trade. They relied on international financial institu-
tions to conduct stabilization and structural adjust-
ment programs and sought to actively position
themselves in the framework of the
Euro–Mediterranean partnership with its special
trading arrangements. On the other hand, Libya
retained a prominent role for the state and sought
to reform the public sector without necessarily
affecting private sector intervention. Efforts were
undertaken to have the private sector play a more
important role in an economy dominated by a
more efficient and productive public sector
(DeRosa 1997). Nevertheless, progress has been
generally slow in trade liberalization in the region.
Moreover, the high tariffs imposed by devel-
oped nations on agricultural products from devel-
oping nations reduce the ability of the developingcountries to export their products and compete in
the world market. A recent study conducted by the
Institute of Economic Affairs in Britain estimates that
EU agricultural policies have reduced African
exports of milk products by more than 90 percent,
livestock by nearly 70 percent, meat by almost 60
percent, and nongrain crops by 50 percent. These
results indicate that EU agricultural policies have
reduced Africa’s total potential agricultural exports
by half during the late 1990s to early 2000s.
Without these agricultural policies, the current
US$10.9 billion food-related exports annually from
Sub-Saharan Africa could actually grow to nearly
US$22 billion. In Sub-Saharan Africa, every US$1
in agricultural income produces an additional
US$1.42 increase in GDP. Thus, without these EU
policies, GDP in Sub-Saharan Africa could actually
grow to nearly US$26.4 billion per year—enough
to increase the annual income of every person in
these countries by nearly 13 percent (Hassett and
Shapiro 2003). If the agricultural policies of
Canada, Japan, and the United States were
included in the analysis, results would indicate





As was shown under VIS and  RMM, significant
increases in investment in rural infrastructure would
help increase food production and consumption,
decrease malnutrition, and increase food security.
Complementary infrastructure built by the villages,
national governments, or NGOs is crucial to
remove any limitations on the participation of the
private sector and increase the costs of input and
output marketing. Critical investments include rural
transportation; rural water infrastructure; village
production infrastructure, such as threshing and
drying floors, and basic village storage facilities;
electricity for agroprocessing; and telecommunica-
tions infrastructure (Reardon et al. 1995; Cleaver
and Donovan 1995; Friis-Hansen 2000). Significant
increases in investment in the exchange of infor-
mation through the use of modern information and
communication technologies (ICT) would enhance
both market efficiency and the research capacity of
the national agriculture research systems (NARSs)
and thus improve the agricultural productivity of
African countries. Use of ICT including Internet con-
nections would provide NARSs with information
access and facilitate networking with other nation-
al, regional, and global agencies (NEPAD 2002). 
The model results also show that increased
investments in education are essential to hasten
improvements in food security. In agricultural
areas, education works directly to enhance the
ability of farmers to adopt more advanced tech-
nologies and crop-management techniques, there-
by achieving higher rates of return on land
(Rosegrant and Cline 2003). More broadly, edu-
cation encourages movement into more remunera-
tive nonfarm employment, helping to increase
household incomes. Success in reducing poverty is
usually enhanced by increasing the proportion of
educational resources going to primary education
and to the poorest groups or regions (Lipton,
Yaqub, and Darbellay 1998; Gaiha 1994; World
Bank 1990; Singh and Hazell 1993). 
Improving rural associations is envisioned to
provide better support to farmers and, at the same
time, become a vehicle for defining and imple-
menting rural development with farmer participa-
tion. In Africa, rural associations give assistance to
farmers in terms of farm inputs and crops; credit to
members (savings societies); joint production of
food crops, particularly for women’s groups; man-
agement of pastures; and processing of agricultur-
al commodities. Donors are also inclined to sup-
port farmers’ groups. Farmer-managed savings
and loan cooperatives in countries like Benin,
Burundi, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, and Rwanda
have been supported by donors and national gov-
ernments and were found to be successful.
However, despite the open and more liberal envi-
ronment for farmers’ associations, and the willing-
ness of donors to support these groups, the volume
of credit, farm inputs, and crops handled by formal
and informal farmers’ groups remains extremely
small. There is a need to better educate farmers
about this type of assistance. Improving the com-
munication sector would contribute significantly to
the development of farmers’ awareness of such
benefits (Cleaver and Donovan 1995).
45The presence of NGOs strengthens the dynam-
ic partnership in fighting rural poverty because of
their flexibility; innovation; and strong social, eco-
nomic, and political support for the poor. In Africa,
NGOs have not worked closely with the public sec-
tor. One of the goals of the New Partnership for
Africa’s Development (NEPAD) is to bridge the gap
between these two groups and improve the
NGO/NARS relationship for the benefit of the rural
poor (NEPAD 2002). Governments and policymak-
ers should focus on policy reforms that promote
investor security, thereby attracting them to the coun-
try or the region in question. Policy sectors needing
to be revisited include agribusiness development,
agricultural marketing and credit, and support for
the telecommunications sector (NEPAD 2002). 
Crop, Land, Water, and Input
Management
The analysis in this paper indicates that sustainable
productivity growth is one of the keys to food secu-
rity improvements. Farmers are the primary man-
agers of land, water, and pastures. They need to
manage problems arising from deteriorating natural
resources. Thus, agricultural input and crop tech-
nologies should focus on land and natural resources
conservation, while at the same time increasing
agricultural productivity. 
As described in detail above, soil fertility
improvement is essential for sustained productivity
use. It may be appropriate to subsidize fertilizers in
the short run in some countries; however, fertilizer
subsidies must be supplemented by government
investments in infrastructure, institutions, and policies
that permanently reduce farm level prices (for exam-
ple, reducing transportation costs and increasing
efficiency in the input and output markets, Gladwin
et al. 2001). But reliance on chemical fertilizers
alone is not enough. An integrated approach to soil
fertility management is recommended to replenish
and improve the soil quality in Africa. Approaches
to soil fertility management must allow farmers to
make decisions on the basis of a combination of
their own knowledge and research-based options.
African governments should also implement policies
to encourage efficiency improvements in farmers’
use of local resources in marginalized areas.
Farmers should depart from the high use of external
inputs as the dominant method for increasing agri-
cultural productivity, as this is not generally econom-
ically viable. The “low external input sustainable
agriculture” (LEISA) technologies, such as integrated
pest management, participatory conservation and
use of plant genetic resources, and integrated soil
fertility management, provide a sound complemen-
tary approach (Friis-Hansen 2000). 
Uncertain land tenure undermines farmers’
incentives to make agricultural investments like
many of the water-harvesting methods mentioned
earlier. Agricultural policy must take into account
the importance of farmer stability in attracting agri-
cultural investments (Reardon et al. 1995). African
governments must take serious action in recogniz-
ing traditional land tenure systems, providing col-
lective land ownership titles to groups, setting up
judicial processes when dealing with disputes, and
improving administrative capacity in land-titling
matters. Studies have shown that in countries like
Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, Nigeria,
Rwanda, South Africa, and Tanzania, traditional
land-tenure relationships are breaking down under
the force of government legislation. This breakdown
is accelerated by land titling, the disappearance of
customary mechanisms of dispute resolution, immi-
gration of people from other ethnic groups, pas-
toral–farmer conflicts, and civil war. There are also
cases where traditional land tenure is robust and
has evolved toward individual ownership and rights
of inheritance. These occur where governments pro-
tect the customary tenure through legislation
(Cleaver and Donovan 1995).
As was shown in the discussion of water
resources, water scarcity has a substantial impact
on agricultural production. One strategy to address
African water scarcity is supply management,
which involves the location, development, and
exploitation of new sources of water for irrigation
and household and industrial uses. In addition,
demand management addresses the incentives and
mechanisms that promote water conservation and
efficient water use (Rosegrant and Perez 1997).
Changing the institutional and legal environment in
which water is supplied and used empowers water
users to make their own decisions regarding the use
of water resources and, at the same time, provides
46a structure that presents the real scarcity value of
water, including environmental externalities
(Rosegrant and Perez 1997). Water subsidies
should not be encouraged, since this leads to over-
use of water resources. Subsidies distort the incen-
tives of users to preserve the resource or to use it in
a cost-effective manner. Overuse of water also com-
pounds land degradation problems, such as those
in Egypt where the low price of water resulted in
area expansion for rice cultivation, in effect increas-
ing waterlogging (UNEP–GEO 2000).
It is essential that investment in irrigation sys-
tems enhances water use efficiency. Groundwater
development offers a major opportunity for promot-
ing agricultural production and improving liveli-
hoods. The exploitation of aquifers should not, how-
ever, undermine their sustainability; excessive use of
groundwater can lead to a declining groundwater
table. The capital required to develop groundwater
irrigation is low, while its productivity is generally
higher than surface irrigation. In addition, farmers
exercise more care in utilizing this kind of irrigation
because of the costs involved in lifting water.
Furthermore, groundwater is a reliable irrigation
source in times of drought (Inocencio, Sally, and
Merrey 2003).
Technology development in Africa involves
investment in efficient irrigation systems, particular-
ly because of the recurrence of droughts. Irrigation
investments in Mauritania, Niger, and Nigeria
have proven productive. The current policy frame-
work in northern Africa fails to address measures
to sustainably manage scarce water and agricul-
tural land. Although some countries apply the con-
cepts of integrated water and land management,
the institutional capacity and popular participation
necessary to avoid conflicts and adverse socioeco-
nomic impacts need to be revisited and strength-
ened (UNEP–GEO 2000). 
Agricultural Research and
Extension
Dramatic increases are needed in agricultural
research investments if any plan for food and nutri-
tion security in Africa is to be successful. Drastic
changes must also take place in the way research
and extension are carried out in Africa. In terms of
soil fertility, there is a need to generate knowledge
about fertilizer use and to diffuse that knowledge to
the farm population. Expanded research efforts are
needed to better understand semi-arid soils and to
solve the very specific problems caused by lack of
knowledge of local responses to the application of
fertilizers. Expansion of extension efforts is neces-
sary in most semi-arid African countries to help
farmers learn new production practices and more
economic resource use (Gladwin et al. 2001).
Lack of farmer knowledge about fertilizer use
impedes agricultural growth in Africa (Gladwin et
al. 2001). Decisions about how much fertilizer to
use and where and how to apply it have become a
very complicated issue. Likewise, crop diversifica-
tion, especially into high-value crops, has been slow
to develop because of limited technological oppor-
tunities available at the farm level. This is also relat-
ed to the provision of credit to small-scale farmers
(Friis-Hansen 2000). Policy reform must include
improving extension agent training and ensuring
that feedback is solicited from farmers. Extension
workers are also crucial in furthering the accept-
ance of the LEISA technologies discussed earlier.
Moreover, extension workers should engage their
client farmers in critical thinking about their agricul-
tural endeavors and management of their farming
enterprises (Friis-Hansen 2000).
A key area for improvement in research is crop
breeding and biotechnology. An example of a suc-
cessful breeding technique is a hybrid between
Asian and African species called “New Rice for
Africa,” which was bred to fit the rainfed upland
rice environment in West Africa. This new variety
produces over 50 percent more grain than current
varieties when grown in traditional rainfed systems
without fertilizer, matures 30–50 days earlier than
current varieties, and is far more tolerant to disease
and drought compared with current varieties
(Rosegrant et al. 2002). As results under VIS
showed, increases in yields such as those that
could be achieved through crop breeding and
biotechnology can lead to greater agricultural pro-
duction and reduced malnutrition.
The tools of biotechnology are also necessary
for crops in developing countries, particularly for
those grown in high-stress environments, even if
these countries stop short of true transgenic breed-
47ing. Such biotechnologies could include marker-
assisted selection and cell and tissue culture tech-
niques. However, molecular biotechnology has
been applied only to a small number of traits of
interest to commercial farmers, mainly developed
by a few life science companies operating at the
global level. It is also recognized that the private
sector will not invest sufficiently to make the need-
ed adaptations in these developing countries and
regions. Thus public–private partnerships will be
important for future development of these technolo-
gies. Moreover, coordination of public research
and extension systems with agricultural faculties in
universities should be strengthened. Further,
stronger networks need to be established for
exchanging technical information within Africa
and outside the region. 
Investment in Women
The improvements in the status of women modeled
under VIS—resulting in lower levels of malnutrition
than any of the other scenarios—show that the sta-
tus of women can influence food security and nutri-
tion in Africa (and worldwide for that matter).
Women provide 70 to 80 percent of household
food production in Sub-Saharan Africa (Brown et
al. 2001). And while farm plots run by women
have been found to have 20–40 percent lower
yields than those run by men, it has been shown
that when women receive the same levels of edu-
cation, experience, and farm inputs as men, they
can increase the yields of some crops by 22 per-
cent (IFPRI 2000). In addition, the level of educa-
tion among women is essential to household pover-
ty reduction. A study focusing on Egypt (IFPRI
2000) found that when mothers’ education levels
were raised to at least the completion of primary
school, the incidence of poverty was reduced by
33.7 percent. The education of women has pow-
erful effects on nearly every dimension of develop-
ment, from lowering fertility rates, to raising pro-
ductivity, to improving environmental management
(World Bank 1996). 
Nevertheless, the role of women is often taken
for granted, especially in developing countries.
Despite the significant responsibility women take
on in the household, gender discrimination is still
prevalent in Africa. This hinders women’s effective-
ness in providing a healthy and secure environ-
ment for their families. If women are to be fully
effective in contributing to food and nutrition secu-
rity, discrimination against them must be eliminated
and the value of their role promoted (Quisumbing,
Meinzen-Dick, and Smith 2004). Eliminating gen-
der discrimination requires policy reform in support
of an equal playing field for both men and women
in Africa. 
The Women’s Budget Initiative in South Africa,
which began in 1990, is an example of a program
that is making steps toward raising the profile of
gender issues in Africa. This collaboration between
the parliamentary Joint Standing Committee on
Finance and several NGOs in South Africa is
assessing the public budgetary allocations
between men and women. Under the initiative,
budget allocations for education, service provi-
sion, public-sector employment, provision for child
care, and employment benefits are being tracked.
In Sub-Saharan Africa, there have been successful
attempts to close the gap in equality between men
and women in the areas of land, water, livestock,
education, technology, social capital, and health
(Quisumbing, Meinzen-Dick, and Smith 2004). 
In summary, the IMPACT results indicate that if
the results modeled under VIS are to be realized,
far higher investments in agricultural productivity,
water resource use, and human well being will be
necessary. VIS represents a self-reinforcing virtuous
cycle of higher growth and higher investment,
which has been beyond Africa’s reach to date.
Unfortunately, despite signs in some countries that
political leaders recognize the costs of lack of long-
term investment, the results indicated under PES
could easily become the more plausible future real-
ity unless many of the recommendations set out
above are addressed. The unsatisfactory prospects
for Sub-Saharan Africa under BAU show that more
aggressive policy action on multiple fronts is imper-
ative to food security in the region. Similarly, results
confirmed under VIS show that massive increases
in investment will be necessary to achieve serious
inroads against child malnutrition. 
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Region/Country Irrigated Rainfed Total Irrigated Rainfed Total
Northern Sub-Saharan Africa 1.1 29.8 30.1 1.4 41.6 43.0
Central and western Sub-
Saharan Africa 0.2 9.6 9.8 0.4 15.0 15.4
Southern Sub-Saharan Africa 0.6 8.1 8.7 1.0 10.7 11.7
Eastern Sub-Saharan Africa 0.1 6.5 6.6 0.2 8.6 8.8
Nigeria 1.3 16.6 17.9 1.9 21.9 23.8
All Sub-Saharan Africa 3.3 69.8 73.0 4.9 97.7 102.6
Egypt 2.6 0.0 2.6 2.5 0.0 2.5
Other West Asia/North Africa 6.9 20.3 27.2 8.0 22.2 30.2
All Africa 12.8 90.1 102.8 15.4 119.9 135.3
Table A.1—Projected irrigated, rainfed, and total cereal area in Africa under the 
business as usual scenario, 1995 and 2025
Source: Rosegrant, Cai, and Cline 2002.
Note: The total for “All Africa” is slightly higher than the actual total for all the individual countries because the
IMPACT–WATER model includes some West Asian countries in the “Other West Asia/North Africa” region (Cyprus,
Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen).
Cereal area (million hectares)
Baseline 1995 Projected 2025
Region/Country Irrigated Rainfed Total Irrigated Rainfed Total
Northern Sub-Saharan Africa 1.6 18.8 20.4 3.1 43.2 46.3
Central and western Sub-
Saharan Africa 0.4 8.7 9.1 1.1 19.3 20.4
Southern Sub-Saharan Africa 1.1 7.7 8.8 2.4 14.7 17.1
Eastern Sub-Saharan Africa 0.3 9.2 9.5 0.5 16.1 16.7
Nigeria 3.7 14.9 18.5 8.7 28.7 37.3
All Sub-Saharan Africa 7.0 59.2 66.2 15.7 122.0 137.7
Egypt 14.3 0.0 14.3 20.8 0.0 20.8
Other West Asia/North Africa 19.4 20.6 40.0 30.6 28.7 59.3
All Africa 40.8 79.8 120.6 67.0 150.8 217.8
Table A.2—Projected irrigated, rainfed, and total cereal production in Africa under the 
business as usual scenario, 1995 and 2025
Source: Rosegrant, Cai, and Cline 2002.
Note: The total for “All Africa” is slightly higher than the actual total for all the individual countries because the
IMPACT–WATER model includes some West Asian countries in the “Other West Asia/North Africa” region (Cyprus,
Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen).
Cereal production (million metric tons)
Baseline 1995 Projected 202550
Region/Country Irrigated Rainfed Total Irrigated Rainfed Total
Northern Sub-Saharan Africa 1.51 0.65 0.68 2.17 1.04 1.08
Central and western Sub-
Saharan Africa 1.99 0.91 0.93 2.93 1.29 1.33
Southern Sub-Saharan Africa 1.91 0.95 1.01 2.49 1.37 1.47
Eastern Sub-Saharan Africa 2.07 1.42 1.43 2.49 1.89 1.90
Nigeria 2.84 0.90 1.04 4.54 1.31 1.57
All Sub-Saharan Africa 2.16 0.85 0.91 3.23 1.25 1.34
Egypt 5.48 0.00 5.48 8.36 0.00 8.36
Other West Asia/North Africa 2.81 1.02 1.47 1.51 1.29 1.39
All Africa 3.19 0.89 1.17 2.43 1.26 1.48
Table A.3—Projected irrigated, rainfed, and total cereal yields in Africa under the 
business as usual scenario, 1995 and 2025
Source: Rosegrant, Cai, and Cline 2002.
Note: The total for “All Africa” is slightly higher than the actual total for all the individual countries because the
IMPACT–WATER model includes some West Asian countries in the “Other West Asia/North Africa” region (Cyprus,
Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen).
Cereal yields (metric tons per hectare)
Baseline 1995 Projected 2025
Region/Country Irrigated Rainfed Total Irrigated Rainfed Total
Northern Sub-Saharan Africa 0.85 0.00 0.85 0.83 0.00 0.83
Central and western Sub-
Saharan Africa 0.14 5.71 5.85 0.13 7.60 7.73
Southern Sub-Saharan Africa 2.08 0.23 2.30 2.58 0.28 2.86
Eastern Sub-Saharan Africa 0.17 2.26 2.42 0.16 2.97 3.13
Nigeria 5.28 0.00 5.28 6.64 0.00 6.64
All Sub-Saharan Africa 8.52 8.20 16.72 10.34 10.85 21.19
Egypt 0.12 0.00 0.12 0.13 0.00 0.13
Other West Asia/North Africa 0.13 0.30 0.43 0.19 0.31 0.50
All Africa 8.76 8.50 17.27 10.66 11.16 21.82
Table A.4—Projected irrigated, rainfed, and total roots and tubers area in Africa under 
the business as usual scenario, 1995 and 2025
Source: Rosegrant, Cai, and Cline 2002.
Note: The total for “All Africa” is slightly higher than the actual total for all the individual countries because the
IMPACT–WATER model includes some West Asian countries in the “Other West Asia/North Africa” region (Cyprus,
Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen).
Roots and tubers area (million hectares)
Baseline 1995 Projected 202551
Region/Country Irrigated Rainfed Total Irrigated Rainfed Total
Northern Sub-Saharan Africa 3.3 0.0 3.3 4.2 0.0 4.2
Central and western Sub-
Saharan Africa 1.6 42.1 43.6 2.1 87.8 89.9
Southern Sub-Saharan Africa 10.4 1.5 11.9 18.3 2.9 21.2
Eastern Sub-Saharan Africa 1.5 14.4 15.9 2.1 30.4 32.5
Nigeria 53.0 0.0 53.0 100.3 0.0 100.3
All Sub-Saharan Africa 69.7 58.0 127.7 126.9 121.1 248.0
Egypt 2.5 0.0 2.5 3.6 0.0 3.6
Other West Asia/North Africa 3.3 4.2 7.5 9.0 8.9 17.8
All Africa 75.4 62.2 137.7 139.5 130.0 269.5
Table A.5—Projected irrigated, rainfed, and total roots and tubers production in Africa 
under the business as usual scenario, 1995 and 2025
Source: Rosegrant, Cai, and Cline 2002.
Note: The total for “All Africa” is slightly higher than the actual total for all the individual countries because the
IMPACT–WATER model includes some West Asian countries in the “Other West Asia/North Africa” region (Cyprus,
Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen).
Roots and tubers production (million metric tons)
Baseline 1995 Projected 2025
Region/Country Irrigated Rainfed Total Irrigated Rainfed Total
Northern Sub-Saharan Africa 3.9 0.0 3.9 5.0 0.0 5.0
Central and western Sub-
Saharan Africa 11.5 7.4 7.5 16.2 11.6 11.6
Southern Sub-Saharan Africa 5.0 6.6 5.2 7.1 10.4 7.4
Eastern Sub-Saharan Africa 8.8 6.4 6.6 12.9 10.2 10.4
Nigeria 10.0 0.0 10.0 15.1 0.0 15.1
All Sub-Saharan Africa 8.2 7.1 7.6 12.3 11.2 11.7
Egypt 21.3 0.0 21.3 28.2 0.0 28.2
Other West Asia/North Africa 25.7 14.0 17.4 47.2 28.6 35.7
All Africa 8.6 7.3 8.0 13.1 11.6 12.4
Table A.6—Projected irrigated, rainfed, and total roots and tubers yield in Africa under 
the business as usual scenario, 1995 and 2025
Source: Rosegrant, Cai, and Cline 2002.
Note: The total for “All Africa” is slightly higher than the actual total for all the individual countries because the
IMPACT–WATER model includes some West Asian countries in the “Other West Asia/North Africa” region (Cyprus,
Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen).
Roots and tubers yield (million tons per hectare)
Baseline 1995 Projected 202552
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